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ABSTRACT 
Liberal peacebuilding, based on the ideology of liberal peace, became the hegemonic 
form of peace construction after the end of the Cold War. As performed by the United 
Nations (UN), liberal peacebuilding does not include endogenously developed 
answers to conflict in its formula for peace. The troubled relationship between the UN 
and the local has long been criticised by peace studies scholars, who have been 
exposing its hybrid character by recognising agency in local actors. My intention is to 
take these critiques further and draw attention to the importance of revealing the 
local understandings of peace that produced resistance to international intervention. 
For this, I suggest the integration by peace studies, of a new conceptual framework to 
deal with local epistemologies. The research question guiding this dissertation thus 
becomes: how can Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ conceptual framework of the 
epistemologies of the South further the knowledge and practice of peacebuilding? The 
argument set out is that the liberal peace concept, as part of modern western 
thinking, constitutes an abyssal line, radically excluding all other forms of social, 
political and economic organisation found in post-conflict spaces that do not conform 
to liberal values. The epistemologies of the South are able to confront this hegemony 
through the practice of the sociologies of absences and emergences and the work of 
translation, which reveal local epistemologies. Integrating this framework into peace 
studies constitutes a conceptual advancement since it helps to explain different 
visions of peace, thereby contributing to a broader understanding of this concept and 
enriching peaces that are already known. Thus, the dissertation makes a twofold 
contribution: first, it constitutes an epistemological critique of the liberal peace as 
associated with modern Western thinking; second, it constitutes a conceptual 
contribution, since it explores different tools to investigate endogenous forms of 
peace. Its main goal is to inspire new research into peace and peace construction that 
follow the epistemologies of the South framework and thus help to deepen the 
understanding of these concepts. 
Key-Concepts: Liberal Peace, Liberal Peacebuilding, Modern Western Thinking, 
Abyssal Global Lines, Epistemologies of the South. 
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RESUMO 
A construção da paz de carácter liberal, baseada na ideologia da paz liberal, tornou-se 
hegemónica após o fim da Guerra Fria. Este modelo de construção da paz, 
desenvolvido pela Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU), não inclui na sua fórmula 
para a paz soluções para o conflito desenvolvidas endogenamente. A relação difícil 
entre a ONU e o local é há muito criticada pelos académicos dos Estudos para a Paz, 
que têm exposto o seu carácter híbrido, reconhecendo agência aos actores locais. A 
minha intenção é aprofundar estas críticas, chamando a atenção para a importância 
de expor os entendimentos de paz locais que produzem resistência à intervenção 
internacional. Para isto, sugiro a integração pelos Estudos para a Paz de um novo 
quadro conceptual para lidar com epistemologias locais. Neste sentido, pretende-se 
responder à pergunta: como pode o quadro conceptual das epistemologias do Sul, 
definido por Boaventura de Sousa Santos, desenvolver o conhecimento e prática 
sobre a construção da paz? O argumento exposto é que o conceito de paz liberal, 
associado ao pensamento moderno ocidental, constitui uma linha abissal, excluindo 
radicalmente todas as formas de organização social, política e económica existentes 
nos espaços pós-conflito que não se coadunam com os valores liberais. As 
epistemologias do Sul são capazes de confrontar esta hegemonia através da prática 
das sociologias das ausências e das emergências e do trabalho de tradução, revelando 
epistemologias locais. Integrar este quadro nos Estudos para a Paz constitui um 
avanço conceptual, uma vez que ajuda a expor visões de paz diferentes contribuindo 
para o alargamento do entendimento deste conceito e enriquecendo conceitos de paz 
já conhecidos. Desta forma, o contributo da dissertação é duplo: primeiro, constitui 
uma crítica epistemológica à paz liberal, vista como parte integrante do pensamento 
moderno ocidental; segundo, constitui um contributo conceptual, uma vez que 
explora diferentes ferramentas para a investigação de conceitos de paz endógenos. O 
objectivo principal é inspirar novas investigações sobre os conceitos de paz e de 
construção da paz que apliquem o quadro das epistemologias do Sul, aprofundando o 
conhecimento existente sobre estes conceitos. 
Conceitos-Chave: Paz Liberal, Construção da Paz Liberal, Pensamento Moderno 
Ocidental, Linhas Abissais Globais, Epistemologias do Sul. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the 1990s the periphery of the international system was 
ravaged by several intra-state conflicts, which were qualified as a threat to 
international peace and security (Cravo, 2013: 22). In order to respond to the new 
international context after the Cold War and the rise of violence in the global South, 
the United Nations (UN) developed a set of mechanisms to deal with countries 
affected by conflict. These tools were consolidated in the famous report “An Agenda 
for Peace” that institutionalised, for the first time, the concept of post-conflict 
peacebuilding, which aimed to “identify and support structures that (…) strengthen 
and solidify peace, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UNSG, 1992: §21). The 
peacebuilding definition was deepened over the years in different UN reports (UN, 
2000; UNDP, 2012) to express an increasing connection to the liberal peace. This 
paradigm can be briefly described as a combination of peace, democracy and a 
market economy, giving significant emphasis to the rule of law, human rights and 
neo-liberal development (Richmond, 2006: 292). 
By that time, the UN already had some experience in peace missions, having 
tried to mediate conflicts such as the Israel and Palestine conflict and the conflict over 
Kashmir (Bellamy et al., 2010: 83-84). Yet, the five permanent members of the 
Security Council1 were not in favour of major UN participation in the affairs of their 
allies and client states and the Cold War ideological divergences did not allow a 
coherent involvement, since it was not possible to agree on the promotion of a 
particular model of domestic governance (Paris, 2004: 15). Thus, only with the end of 
the Cold War is there an increase in the demand for peace missions and a willingness 
by UN member states to supply them. 
The new climate in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
reduced their military and economic assistance to their allies (Paris, 2004: 16). This 
reality allowed a greater involvement of the UN in conflict and post-conflict scenarios, 
stimulated by requests for help in implementing peace accords and also by a more 
1 French Republic, People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States of 
America. 
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cooperative Security Council. There was a feeling of a triumph of liberalism and many 
in the West thought peace operations could be used to stop governments mistreating 
their people, resolve civil wars and spread democracy (Bellamy et al., 2010: 96). It 
was the “end of history”, the idea that a huge consensus on the legitimacy of liberal 
democracy as the right form of government was emerging and that humanity might 
have come to the end of its ideological evolution (Fukuyama, 2007: 13). 
Peacebuilding missions developed in this historical context. International 
relations were pervaded by a great optimism and reinvigorated collective security 
mechanisms were developed by the UN as a strategy for peace. The principles of 
market economy and multiparty democracy were endorsed as global recipes for 
development, peace and stability and international actors started to converge in the 
adoption of assertive responses to international challenges (Yannis, 2002: 825-826). 
The post-Cold War period witnessed the emergence and consolidation of the liberal 
peace, the ideological framework that has guided the United Nations peace action 
ever since. 
Nevertheless, this development was not free of critiques. The first generation 
of critics also emerged in the 1990s and highlighted the practical issues of mission 
implementation and organisation (Cravo, 2013: 25-27). With the evolution of UN 
peacebuilding and a growing body of academic work on this subject, the critics 
started to pay attention to the model of peace being enforced. These critiques can be 
divided into two groups: the problem-solvers and the critics. The first identify 
different flaws in the liberal peace model but do not reject it, indeed, they make 
suggestions to upgrade its efficiency2 (Cravo, 2013: 29). The critics3 go further in 
their analysis, criticising the principles of liberal peace and stressing the hegemonic 
power relations that constitute peacebuilding practices (Chandler, 2010: 140; Cravo, 
2013: 29). Hegemony is here defined in line with Gramsci’s definition, as the capacity 
of a dominant class to exercise its power (in its political, economic, cultural and 
ideological dimensions) through the consent of the ones being dominated, without 
resorting to coercive tools (Sousa, 2005). 
                                                             
2See, for example, Paris, 1997, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004; Krasner, 2004; Ghani et al., 2006. 
3See, among others, Chandler, 2006; Richmond, 2006; Duffield, 2007; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012. 
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Contribution 
This dissertation is aligned with the second group of critics, nevertheless, it 
goes beyond the existing critiques of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding by 
bringing to the discipline of international relations the concepts of an author who is 
mostly linked to sociological studies, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Professor at the 
University of Coimbra and author of “A Discourse on the Sciences” (1992), “Towards 
a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition” 
(1995) and “Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide” (2014). His 
concepts, alien to international relations, contribute to developing a broader 
framework of analysis and interpretation of the liberal peace, with the critique of 
modern Western thinking at its centre. Furthermore, they help to question liberal 
peace through the exposure of other forms of peace based on different 
epistemologies. The contribution of this dissertation is twofold: first it constitutes an 
epistemological critique of the liberal peace as associated with modern Western 
thinking; second, it constitutes a conceptual contribution, since it explores different 
tools to investigate endogenous forms of peace. 
Research Question 
In this regard, the starting point of this investigation is to understand how 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the 
South (Santos, 2007, 2010a, 2014) can further the knowledge and practice of 
peacebuilding? 
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
This work aims to provide a critical understanding of liberal peace and 
liberal peacebuilding and can therefore be included in the field of peace studies. A lot 
has been written on this (Fetherston, 2000; Richmond, 2004; Chandler, 2006; Jabri, 
2013; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013), giving emphasis to the hegemonic character of 
liberal peace, which imposes a model of political, social and economic organisation 
that follows Western standards and disregards local features. The use of Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos concepts is intended to further these critiques and so contribute to a 
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better understanding of the power and domination system underlying liberal peace 
and more clearly explain its epistemological foundations. It is thus possible to 
deconstruct liberal peace’s totalising character and lend visibility to locally 
constructed peace models. What is being highlighted is that liberal peace is associated 
with a very specific kind of knowledge and ways of reproducing it, which have been 
made hegemonic by modern Western science, through colonial and capitalist 
relationships with the global South. The South is here seen as a metaphor for the 
systemic and unjust human suffering caused by those relationships (Santos, 2014: 
134). 
Additionally, using the epistemologies of the South framework also 
constitutes a further step in the critiques developed on peacebuilding and the local 
(Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013, for example). These 
works recognise agency in local actors by assuming their capacity to contest 
international intervention. Liberal peace is, therefore, resisted through the practices 
of the everyday, consequently influencing the liberal model and producing hybrid 
forms of peace. Although the recognition of local agency and the realisation that 
liberal peacebuilding is not easily accepted by local actors is important evidence to 
justify questioning liberal peace, following Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ concepts 
allows us to go beyond this reflection. 
The author developed several concepts that I consider crucial to elucidating 
the way liberal peace operates and the effort needed to reveal alternative peaces. The 
first, which is the main analytical tool of this work, is the concept of abyssal global 
lines (Santos, 2007, 2010a, 2014). Modern Western thinking is considered an abyssal 
thinking that creates a system of radical distinctions. Consequently, the abyssal lines 
permanently erase any different realities existing on the other side of the line, 
claiming modern forms of thinking and universal organisation (Santos, 2010a: 23-
24). The liberal peace model is seen here as one of these “abyssal lines”. This concept 
is central to understanding how liberal peace has become a hegemonic peace of 
universal character without any apparent opponent. 
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In addition, the conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South is 
essential to establish alternatives to the current model of peace. This concept 
confronts the monoculture of modern science, recognising the plurality of 
heterogeneous knowledges (Santos, 2010b: 49). It makes an effort to rescue from 
oblivion alternative ways of thinking, which were often catalogued by modern 
Western science as beliefs and superstitions without any scientific validity. In order 
to renounce any general epistemology and therefore any form of universal peace, this 
dissertation associates the peacebuilding strategy with the sociology of absences, the 
sociology of emergences and the work of translation (Santos, 2002a), thus developing a 
post-abyssal peacebuilding model. 
The sociology of absences intends to deconstruct the universal character of 
abyssal thinking by revealing epistemologies hidden until now and disregarded by 
modern Western thinking (Santos, 2014: 171-172). The sociology of emergences 
identifies the future possibilities and expectations enclosed in the knowledges 
brought to light by the sociology of absences (Santos, 2002a: 256). The work of 
translation allows mutual intelligibility among available and possible experiences in 
the world, as shown by the sociologies just mentioned (Santos, 2004: 179). These 
tools serve to describe the epistemological diversity of the world. 
Relevance 
This dissertation suggests using these concepts when investigating how 
peace is thought in post-conflict environments. Recognising the local as a space of 
resistance implies recognising its different epistemologies. Therefore, the relevance 
of this dissertation is to suggest employing a conceptual framework as yet unfamiliar 
to international relations when seeking alternative conceptions of peace, aiming to 
understand what their epistemological foundations are. The framework in question is 
the epistemologies of the South. In this way it is possible to have a broader 
understanding of local agency by revealing the perceptions of peace that have 
produced resistance to international involvement. The use of the epistemologies of 
the South supplements and deepens the work already achieved by hybrid peace 
theories, since explaining different epistemologies gives them relevance and renders 
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them as valid as modern Western thinking. Thus, the local is seen not only as space of 
resistance, but also, as a space of knowledge production. 
Hypotheses 
Therefore, this work aims to address three different hypotheses. First, 
analysing liberal peace through the concept of abyssal lines allows a broader 
understanding of its epistemological nature, constituting a deeper critique of this 
model. Second, using the concepts defined in the framework of the epistemologies of 
the South contributes to revealing alternative conceptions and practices of peace 
based on different epistemologies. Third, the UN can be one of the actors involved in a 
translation process aimed at establishing a dialogue between different models of 
peace. 
Objective 
The main goal of this dissertation is to integrate a new conceptual 
framework, the epistemologies of the South, into peace studies with the aim of 
inspiring new research into peace and peace construction and so deepening the 
understanding of these concepts. 
Argument 
The liberal peace concept as part of modern Western thinking constitutes an 
abyssal line. Likewise, it helps create a system of distinctions that radically exclude all 
other forms of social, political and economic organisation found in post-conflict 
spaces that do not conform to liberal values. Liberal peace is thus a hegemonic peace. 
The epistemologies of the South are able to confront this hegemony through the 
practice of the sociologies of absences and emergences and the work of translation to 
reveal different epistemologies. Therefore, integrating these concepts in the field of 
international relations constitutes an advance for peace studies, since these 
conceptual tools help identify different visions of peace and so contribute to a 
broader understanding of this concept and enrich already known peaces. 
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Methodology 
This dissertation follows the hypothetico-deductive research model (Quivy 
and Campenhoudt, 2013: 144-145), in that it is based on an already existing 
theoretical and conceptual framework, the epistemologies of the South. Through the 
validation of the hypotheses exposed above it examines a very concrete reality, the 
practices of liberal peacebuilding. Thus, in order to understand what this concept 
means for the United Nations, it is necessary to analyse various official documents 
which constitute one of the primary sources used in this research. They span the 
period 1989 to 2012, reflecting a time that saw the emergence and consolidation of 
liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding, and include documents from the UN General 
Assembly, the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary General and the UN 
Peacebuilding Support Office, and similar bodies. The documents cover different 
areas: peace operations and peacebuilding, (UNSG, 1992, 2009; UN, 2000; UNPSO, 
2010), security and development (UN, 2004; UNSG, 2005), democracy (UNSG, 1996), 
fragile contexts (UNDP, 2012), and peace mission mandates (UNSC, 1989, 1992b). 
Another set of primary sources is the work of Professor Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos, since the argument of this dissertation is built upon his conceptual proposals. 
First, it is important to understand his critiques of modern Western thinking, relying 
on his earlier work (Santos, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995), since liberal peace is here 
criticised on an epistemological basis. Then, I explore the concepts defined in the 
more recently developed epistemologies of the South framework (Santos, 2002a, 
2004, 2007, 2010a, 2010c, 2014), in order to develop the post-abyssal peacebuilding 
model. 
The secondary sources of this work are composed of scholarly literature. 
First, on the liberal principles that influence liberal peace (Wilson, 1918; Hobhouse, 
1971; Gray, 1988; Doyle, 1997; Falk, 2000; Kant, 2000, McGrew, 2002; Salle, 2010), 
then, on the discourse that legitimises its application (Helman and Ratner, 1992-93; 
Held, 1995; Zartman, 1995; Soysa and Gleditsch, 2002; Hill, 2005; Pureza et al., 2007). 
Sources on the peacebuilding concept and its evolution are also analysed (Galtung, 
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1976; Ramsbotham, 2000; Ottaway, 2002; Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005; Castillo, 2008; 
Parent, 2010; Bellamy et al., 2010). 
Equally important is to have a broad perspective of the critiques of liberal 
peace and peacebuilding made so far. I first address those developed in the 1990s and 
the early 2000s (Durch, 1992; Mayall, 1996; Downs and Stedman, 2002). Then I look 
at the problem-solving critiques. The time span of the texts (2002-2006) was chosen 
because this period saw the consolidation of the critiques of the fast liberalisation of 
post-conflict environments (Paris, 2002, 2004; Krasner, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; 
Chesterman et al., 2005b; Ghani et al. 2006). The time frame chosen for critical 
authors (2000-2013) is broader since they provide a wide-ranging set of critiques 
(Fetherston, 2000; Pugh, 2004; Richmond, 2004, 2007, 2009; Chandler, 2004a, 2006, 
2008; Duffield, 2007; Newman, 2009; Jabri, 2013). Special emphasis is given to the 
critiques on the local (Richmond and Franks, 2009; Roberts, 2012; Richmond and 
Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). 
Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is structured in four chapters. The first, Understanding 
Liberal Peace, clearly defines the concepts of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding. 
It sets out to identify the theoretical and ideological roots that underlie the bases of 
liberal peace. It also explores the development and implementation of peacebuilding 
in the UN framework for peace, thus contributing to a clear definition of the subject 
studied in this dissertation: liberal peacebuilding. The next chapter, Liberal Peace 
Critiques, presents a description of the different critiques made to liberal peace. It 
addresses the first generation of critiques, which are more concerned with practical 
issues of mission implementation and organisation, the problem-solving critiques, 
concerned with reforming liberal peacebuilding to make it more efficient, and then 
looks at the critical authors who question the liberal character of peacebuilding. This 
chapter is essential to establish my position regarding the already existing critiques 
of liberal peacebuilding and the local, and thus show the relevance of this work. 
The third chapter, Epistemologies of the South: Introducing Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos to International Relations, contains an introduction to the author’s work, 
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highlighting the concepts considered more useful to extend the critique of liberal 
peace and to contribute to the development of peace studies, with particular 
reference to abyssal global lines, sociology of absences, sociology of emergences and 
the work of translation. Lastly, the fourth chapter, Learning From and With the South: 
An Approach to Peacebuilding, relates this conceptual framework to the liberal peace 
and liberal peacebuilding and addresses the three hypotheses formulated above. 
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1ST CHAPTER | UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL PEACE 
The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order ‘to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. Meeting this 
challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and, to a very 
significant degree, the yardstick by which it is judged by the peoples it exists 
to serve (UN, 2000: § 1). 
This chapter explores the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, as defined 
by the United Nations, one of the main tools for the maintenance of international 
peace and security deployed by the organisation since the end of the Cold War. The 
peace and security that the UN strives to keep are of a particular kind. They are 
rooted in liberal values and premises and thus represent the liberal peace, which 
became the UN´s mainstream approach to conflict. The goal is to define this peace 
while understanding where it came from, therefore the different theoretical currents 
of Liberalism that contributed to its formulation will be analysed. This is important to 
explain how the UN peace missions, and peacebuilding in particular, were 
conceptualised at a time of important changes in the international system and how 
intervention in other states’ affairs became natural and justifiable. The historical 
evolution of these missions is also briefly described, to show their increased 
association with liberal peace. Finally, it will be explained how the UN endorses 
liberal peace assumptions in its policy documents. 
 
LIBERALISM 
There is this old idea that war is a consequence of authoritarian, anti-
democratic ruling forces and that on the opposite side “liberal states (…) founded on 
such individual rights as equality before the law, (…) private property, and elected 
representation, are fundamentally against war” therefore “the very existence of 
liberal states (…) makes for peace” (Doyle, 1997: 206). This is the fundamental logic 
behind liberal peace: the idea the liberal state, due to the protection of individual 
political and economic rights is inherently more peaceful than other forms of rule. 
Liberalism is thus composed of a set of principles, common to all the branches of 
liberal theory, which can be identified in liberal peace. 
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The political label of liberal dates back to 1810 and the Spanish Courts, 
where a group of deputies rebelled against absolutist ruling. Nevertheless, the 
principles of liberalism are much older and its emergence is identified with England’s 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, which resulted in the institution of religious tolerance 
and constitutional government. Liberal ideas were thus born from conflict and 
dissent with the abuse of political authority. Therefore, liberalism sought to answer 
the questions: who has the right to political authority and what are its foundations; 
what is the role of that authority and what are its limits (Kukathas, 2001: 123-124). 
Corentin de Salle (2010) identifies John Locke, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek4 as being among the main authors of liberal 
doctrine. 
At the heart of liberalism lies the importance of freedom and liberty of the 
individual. To be free means to have the rights and privileges needed to be able to 
think and act autonomously, that is, to govern ourselves without being governed by 
others (Gray, 1988: 102-103). Being free represents the right to do what we believe 
we should do without constraints (Flamant, 1988: 14-15). Attached to this 
fundamental principle is a set of rights endorsed by liberalism. The first group can be 
summarised as freedom from arbitrary authority (Doyle, 1997: 207). These are 
considered negative freedoms and basically constitute the protection of each 
individual against society and, in particular, the power of state authorities (Flamant, 
1988: 23). This group consists of both civil and personal liberties. Among these 
liberties can be found the right to be dealt with in accordance with the law, on the 
basis of an egalitarian and impartial application of the law (Hobhouse, 1971: 16-17); 
as well as liberty of thought and conscience, freedom of speech, writing, printing and 
peaceful discussion or religious liberty (Hobhouse, 1971: 19-20; Doyle, 1997: 207). 
Doyle (1997: 207) defines the second set of liberties as the protection and 
promotion of the capacity and opportunity for freedom. This group includes social 
and economic rights such as equality of opportunities both in education and the 
                                                             
4Some of their most important works are: Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1960); Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America, Volume I (1835) and Volume II (1840); Mill’s On Liberty (1869); Friedman’s 
Capitalism and Freedom (1971); Hayek’s Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume I (1973), Volume II 
(1976), Volume III (1979). 
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pursuit of an occupation. It also envisages the establishment of free trade unions, the 
liberty of free contract and personal responsibility. The right to education, regular 
employment and health care are also among these liberties (Hobhouse, 1971: 23). To 
guarantee these two groups of rights we need a final set of liberties that define the 
political rights of the individual, that is, the organisation of the participation of 
citizens in collective life (Flamant, 1988: 23). Among these rights are democratic 
participation, representation and universal suffrage based on the ideal of sovereignty 
of the people (Hobhouse, 1971: 28; Doyle, 1997: 207). One of the main concerns of 
liberalism is how to guarantee these liberties and the peaceful coexistence of millions 
of free individuals. This problem has been solved through institutional answers and 
the building of the modern state (Kukathas, 2001: 125; Salle, 2010: 17). 
The first institution developed by liberalism to secure individual freedoms 
and peaceful coexistence within societies was the rule of law. Besides guaranteeing 
judicial equality and impartiality, it establishes a set of general and abstract rules that 
should guide the application of justice (Salle, 2010: 17). Law is thus the first step to 
liberty. Men and women are only free when they are controlled by principles and 
rules that all society must obey (Hobhouse, 1971: 19). Attached to the primacy of the 
law is the development of the constitutional state. The power and authority of the 
state must be limited by a system of constitutional rules and practices that guarantee 
the respect of individual liberty and equality under the law (Gray, 1988: 123). 
Abuse of power is also avoided by applying another principle of liberalism, 
the separation of powers. This means that the executive, legislative and judicial 
powers are deliberately attributed to different entities (Kukathas, 2001: 131). 
Another important principle is that the protection of individual liberties implies the 
defence of private property and  a free market. The value of a free market lies in the 
fact that it allows the non-coercive coordination of economic activities (Gray, 1988: 
105). Private property is connected with the autonomy of the individual and their 
effective capacity to implement their plans and act according to their values without 
constraints (Gray, 1988: 108-110). 
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In the context of the international system, liberalism is also concerned with 
the peaceful coexistence among states, therefore the principles that rule societies 
internally should also guide their international affairs. “It is of the essence of 
Liberalism to oppose the use of force, the basis of all tyranny” (Hobhouse, 1971: 27). 
Liberals consider that there are great prospects for an expanded state of peace to 
emerge; the expectation is not to resolve conflict through war but to address 
grievances through international law and formal and informal institutions (Doyle, 
1997: 210). This is due to three common perceptions: (1) international anarchy 
signifies the absence of global government, and is not equated with a general state of 
war; (2) states’ international behaviour reflects their internal organisation and thus 
how they relate to individual human rights; (3) the aims of the state are mainly 
related to the protection and promotion of individual rights (Doyle, 1997: 211). One 
fundamental principle that rules the thought of liberalism about international 
relations is that, as the world becomes free, the use of force becomes meaningless 
(Hobhouse, 1971: 27). Therefore, the existence of other liberal states constitutes an 
opportunity to cooperate in commerce and unite forces against non-liberal states 
(Doyle, 1997: 211). 
These basic trends can all be identified as core assumptions of liberal peace. 
Additionally, there are two main liberal influences on this model: Immanuel Kant and 
internationalism and Woodrow Wilson and idealism. The liberal concept of peace has 
been evolving since the first writings on this subject, and continues today. Next, it will 
be shown how these liberal theories still influence world politics today. 
 
THE LIBERAL PEACE 
Kant and Liberal Internationalism 
In his “Perpetual Peace” theory, Kant argued that it was possible for a 
widening zone of peace to emerge if states followed some basic principles of conduct. 
For him, the absence of world government is not associated with a general state of 
war since international anarchy is tamed and subject to the law. International right 
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was the precondition for a state of peace (Doyle, 1997: 253-255). To achieve peace 
among nations some principles should be respected in order to build confidence 
among states, Kant called them Definite Articles. The first stated that “[t]he civil 
constitution of each state shall be republican” (Kant, 2000: 124), meaning the state 
should be able to combine moral autonomy, individualism and social order while 
maintaining private property and a market oriented economy. Concurrently, it should 
preserve juridical freedom on the basis of a representative government with 
separation of powers (Doyle, 1997: 257). 
The second Article indicated that “[t]he law of nations shall be founded on a 
federation of free states” (Kant, 2000: 124). He believed liberal republics would 
progressively establish peace among themselves through this federation. This would 
be an ever-expanding project able to create a separate peace (Doyle, 1997: 257). 
Finally, he thought “[t]he rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the 
conditions of universal hospitality” (Kant, 2000: 125). This article established a 
cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. Foreigners should 
not be treated with hostility, and conquest and plunder were unjustifiable (Doyle, 
1997: 258). This permits a constitutionalisation of peace and creates the necessary 
conditions for “Perpetual Peace”. It is important to note that liberal republican states 
would maintain peace among them but the state of war would still be real between 
liberal states and non-liberal ones. 
Following Kant’s principles, peace among nations would be possible if states 
were constituted by representative, republican governments, respecting elected 
legislatures, the separation of powers and the rule of law, if there was a commitment 
to respect the rights of other liberal republics, and if social and economic 
interdependence was achieved (Doyle, 1997: 286-287). Kant laid the foundations for 
the development of a specific branch of liberal theory, liberal internationalism. In 
brief, it argues that “mutually reinforcing dynamics of transnational economic 
integration, the diffusion of liberal democracy and the growth of international 
governance creates the conditions for an expanding liberal zone of peace (…)” 
(McGrew, 2002: 268). It is believed that international cooperation is the rational 
answer to conflict between states that share a considerable level of interdependence 
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(McGrew, 2002: 274), therefore economic and commercial relations between states 
foster peace. An international market is also regarded as a source of peace since it 
“removes difficult decisions of production and distribution from the dire sphere of 
state policy” (Doyle, 1997: 283). 
Another factor that contributes to a general state of peace is the way states 
are internally ruled. Republican representation and separation of powers introduce 
domestic restraints on the waging of war, since citizens are asked, through their 
representatives, to give their consent on virtually every declaration of war (Doyle, 
1997: 280). Liberal internationalists consider that war is mainly the result of the 
failure of internal political structures, thus peace also resides in transforming the 
ruling structures of states, in addition to reforming the international order (McGrew, 
2002). This emphasis on internal structures is also recognised by the UN in its policy 
documents concerning the maintenance of peace, as will be shown later. 
Regarding the conduct of international affairs, liberal internationalism sees 
international law as a fundamental piece for the maintenance of world stability, 
mainly because it ensures respect for the legitimate rights of all citizens and republics 
(Doyle, 1997: 282; McGrew, 2002: 270). Global governance is also key in dealing with 
questions of war and peace. It is considered that an international system of 
governance is needed to regulate and coordinate extensive areas of global activity 
and secure conditions for the maintenance of world peace and a liberal world order 
(McGrew, 2002: 270-273). This international system is composed of states that share 
their power with international organisations, transnational civil society, the 
corporate sector and other agencies. Another concern of Liberal Internationalism is to 
create conditions for the democratic and accountable working of this system 
(McGrew, 2002: 278). 
These are necessary conditions for the emergence of a “Democratic Peace”: 
the idea that liberal states do not go to war with other liberal states and tend to be in 
relations of amity between them (Dunne, 2001: 171). Behind this faith lies a very 
simple logic: if liberal democratic states are a guarantee of world peace there is a 
need to expand this form of rule and so widen the zone of peace. This reasoning 
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provides legitimacy for the “export” of Liberalism beyond its Western core and for 
interventionist practices of the West in the global South (Dunne, 2001: 172; McGrew, 
2002: 277). Liberal values are being spread in order to expand the zone of peace 
through humanitarian intervention after the collapse of state structures, institutional 
leverage and conditionality (Dunne, 2001: 172-173). This kind of rationality is also 
expressed and used as justification for intervention in UN policy documents, as shown 
below. 
Idealism 
As mentioned earlier, another great influence on liberal peace is idealism. It 
considered that the maintenance of world peace required a “system of governance 
which had democratic procedures for coping with disputes, and an international force 
which could be mobilized if negotiations failed” (Dunne, 2001: 167). Basically, what 
was being defended was a “rule-governed global security system that protected states 
threatened by aggressive war” (Falk, 2000: 245). “Law-abiding states in these 
collective security arrangements were to come together as collective law enforcers 
against any state committing aggression” (Viotti and Kauppi, 2014: 135). The idealist 
values became more current after the scourge of World War I. 
The greatest contribution of idealism to the development of liberal peace is 
its practical influence. It lays the necessary doctrinal foundations for the development 
of institutional arrangements to facilitate peaceful coexistence among states. The first 
attempt to institutionalise peaceful cooperation was the League of Nations, widely 
supported by the United States President Woodrow Wilson. He was one of the biggest 
enthusiasts of the creation of an international organisation that could help maintain 
peace after the end of World War I, as is evident in its fourteen-points discourse: “a 
general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike” (Wilson, 1918: XIV). The League of Nations 
was supposed to enforce international law. There was a belief that international 
relations would gradually evolve to accomplish the ideals of justice and fraternity, 
and that rationality and morality inherent to the human being would also be stated in 
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diplomatic relations. This was a reflection of the confidence in states’ goodwill and 
spirit of cooperation (Miyamoto, 1999: 30-32). 
Although the League of Nations failed to attain its goals, mainly because the 
United States did not join, despite Wilson’s enthusiasm, the idea of an organisation 
that would practise collective security would survive until the creation of the United 
Nations in 1945. This institutional development is the first materialisation of liberal 
peace. The UN was created to regulate and maintain peaceful cooperation among 
states. Through its different institutions and agencies it has established the political 
and economic norms that should be followed by the international community of 
states. Although the Cold War had sometimes troubled the activity of this 
organisation, the foundations were laid for the hegemonic development of liberal 
peace. During this period several peace missions were deployed, almost all related to 
the processes of decolonisation. At the time, UN action was seen in terms of 
preventive diplomacy, that is, intervention to prevent the escalation of local conflicts 
into regional and global wars (Bellamy et al., 2010: 84). 
More critical authors warn that the idealist support for the creation of a 
general association of nations is related to the idea that peace is not a natural 
condition and therefore must be constructed (Dunne, 2001: 173). This reasoning 
legitimises intervention in the name of the liberal good. Idealists consider that peace 
and justice are the product of deliberate design and thus encouraging or even 
coercing non-liberal states to become liberal democracies is only part of the process 
(Dunne, 2001: 173). Currently, there is the belief that liberal states have a duty to 
help those whose humanity is threatened, which provides a justification for 
intervention in the institutional, constitutional and civil society mechanisms that can 
harm the liberal peace (Richmond, 2007a). This duty is well expressed in the UN’s 
“responsibility to protect”: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
(…) crimes against humanity. (…) The international community, through the 
United Nations, also has the responsibility to (…) take collective action (…) 
[whenever] national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations (UNGA, 2005a: § 138-139). 
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Idealism, as liberal internationalism, has contributed to the definition of the 
core values and assumptions of liberal peace. They are a mix of “self-determination, 
liberal democracy, neoliberal economic reform, human rights, a balancing of state and 
human security, international legal regimes such as international human rights and 
humanitarian law” (Richmond, 2007a: 58). Later in this chapter, there will be an 
analysis of how these values are expressed in UN policy documents and peace 
missions. For now, it is important to stress that the state is still central in the 
projection of liberal peace. Without states it is not possible to expand the liberal zone 
of peace, since they are still the fundamental units of the international system upon 
which all the assumptions described above are founded. “Specific states do make the 
liberal peace possible” (Richmond, 2007a: 58). 
The Importance of the State and Good Governance 
Like Kant, who argued that the internal government of the state had to be 
republican, the contemporary liberal understanding of the state also defines the 
specific characteristics each state must possess in order to belong to the expanded 
zone of peace. These states are liberal democracies. Liberal democracy has been 
endorsed as the right model of governance by an “international civil service at large”, 
comprising state and non-state, military and civilian, international and local actors 
(Jabri, 2013: 8). Liberal democracy is consensually seen as an agent of progress and 
capitalism as the only viable economic system. Indeed, it is believed that ideological 
differences are gradually being replaced by universal democratic and market-
oriented thinking (Held, 1995: 3-4). One important feature of liberal democracy is 
representative politics; this justifies the sovereign power of the state while at the 
same time placing restraints on that power. Representative democracy is seen as an 
important institutional progress towards solving the problem of matching coercive 
power with liberty. 
According to Held, “liberal democrats argued [that] the democratic 
constitutional state, linked to other key institutional mechanisms, particularly the 
free market, would resolve the problems of ensuring both liberty and authority” 
(1995: 9). Soysa and Gleditsch reinforce this position by stating that “[o]pen markets 
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create prosperity, strengthen institutions and indirectly create the conditions that 
promote democracy. Social peace also follows under these conditions as an 
unintended consequence” (2002: 29). The importance ascribed to free elections and 
the free market is related to the idea that collective good can only be attained if 
individuals interact in a competitive environment, pursuing their satisfaction with 
little interference from the state (Held, 1995). 
To sum up, liberal democracies should have most of the following 
characteristics: elected governments, free and fair elections, universal suffrage, 
freedom of conscience, information on all public matters, right to oppose the 
government and associational autonomy (Held, 1995: 129). For Ghani et al. the 
twenty-first century state’s role is “to produce and re-produce an inclusive political, 
social and economic order underwritten by the rule of law” (2006: 110-111). This 
model will be endorsed by the UN in its peacebuilding missions. The organisation 
recognises that “democracy contributes to preserving peace and security, securing 
justice and human rights, and promoting economic and social development” (UNSG, 
1996: § 16). 
Although liberal democracy is now seen by the international community as 
the only right model for ruling the internal business of a country, it was only in the 
20th century that it was established as the main governance system in the West and 
adopted as the ideal model of government for the global South. Nevertheless, with the 
intensification of globalisation and the general process of economic, political and 
social integration that states are undergoing, the ideas of political democracy and 
market economy are rapidly being spread (Soysa and Gleditsch, 2002: 26). With the 
affirmation by the international community of liberal democracy as the sole 
legitimate model of governance, those countries that do not follow it started to be 
accused of bad governance, which is perceived as one of the main causes of 
underdevelopment. 
Governance matters to “insure quality institutions that provide a stable 
environment for economic growth (…) and serve to moderate forces that may be 
detrimental to peace and social well-being" (Soysa and Gleditsch, 2002: 52). According 
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to the UN “[d]emocracy today is receiving widespread acknowledgment for its 
capacity to foster good governance, which is perhaps the single most important 
development variable within the control of individual States” (UNSG, 1996: § 24). 
States that are not capable of following the principles of good governance are 
characterised as failing states. This reasoning, also present in UN policy documents, 
created a greater legitimisation for Western intervention in the global South. These 
states are seen as in need of fixing and are helped to achieve the liberal good. 
The Failed State 
Indeed, the failed, fragile and collapsed state discourse started to emerge at 
the end of the Cold War. Helman and Ratner (1992-93: 1-3) consider that this 
phenomenon had its origin in the vast proliferation of nation-states after the end of 
World War II, owing to the decolonisation process and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. Ayoob also reinforces this position, asserting that “[s]tate 
breaking and state failure, both unavoidable accompaniments of the state-making 
process, lie at the root of most conflicts that the international system has witnessed 
since the end of the World War II” (2009: 95). These states lacked experience in 
government, had weak institutions and limited economic prospects, all combined 
with ethnic strife to create the conditions for the collapse of many states (Helman and 
Ratner: 1992-93). The danger was evident, “[d]isease, overpopulation, unprovoked 
crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-
states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security 
firms and drug cartels (…)” abounded all through the global South (Kaplan, 1994: 5). 
The consequence was states that could no longer perform the functions needed for 
them to be considered as such (Zartman, 1995:5). 
According to Zartman, “[a] state is the authoritative political institution that 
is sovereign over a recognized territory”, therefore it must perform the following 
functions: the state as the sovereign authority, the state as an institution and the state 
as the security guarantor for a populated territory (1995: 5). Collapse means these 
basic functions are no longer performed, thus, the state suffers a loss of legitimacy, no 
longer having the right to rule (Zartman, 1995: 5). The failed state is also incapable of 
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remaining as a member of the international community, since it threatens its 
neighbours with refugee flows, political instability and random warfare (Helman and 
Ratner, 1992-93). 
For Ayoob, this happens because post-colonial states were forced to build 
nation-states in a limited period, having to follow international norms that demand 
respect for human rights and with liberal democracy limiting the state’s ability to 
pursue state-making; inevitably these processes led to crises that became 
unmanageable (2009: 98-99). The collapse of a state is not a sudden phenomenon, it 
is a “long-term degenerative disease” (Zartman, 1995: 8) and therefore something 
must be done to save these states from “self-destruction” (Helman and Ratner, 1992-
93: 11). This reality “has augmented the impression that there are two distinct zones 
in the international system – the zone of peace in the North and the zone of turmoil in 
the South” (Ayoob, 2009: 96). 
The discourse on fragile, failed and collapsed states became more prominent 
after the 2001 September 11 attacks and the inclusion of these concepts in some 
Western states’ policy documents (Yannis, 2002; Woodward, 2004). Since then, 
failing states have been considered the primary global threat to international 
security. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, violation of human rights, poverty and 
conflict are considered to be the responsibility of states and therefore their 
intensification is a consequence of state weakness (Woodward, 2004: 1). The rising 
importance attached to state collapse is related to the perception that the 
disintegration of a state in a world divided into states constitutes a primary threat to 
the international system (Yannis, 2002; Woodward, 2004) and therefore “[s]ecurity 
in the world (…) is largely predicated on the internal stability of the member states of 
the international system” (Yannis, 2002: 823). The same is recognised by the UN: 
“[a]ny event or process that (…) undermines States as the basic unit of the 
international system is a threat to international security” (2004: 2). 
Although the concepts of failing, failed and collapsed states have become 
common in international politics, that does not mean these terms are free of critiques. 
Susan Woodward argues that the idea of state failure raises several problems since it 
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“is not defined in a way that makes it possible to analyse empirically” and has very 
different meanings to the various communities intervening in these spaces (2004: 4). 
This author also points out that the discourse around collapsed states tends to ignore 
the international community’s contribution to this phenomenon, blaming only the 
internal actors’ performance. The role that the imposition of modern Western social 
and political imperatives on post-colonial states, plus the effects of different 
strategies of development programmes allied with conditionality, might play in state 
fragility is rarely acknowledged (Pureza et al., 2007: 4). 
Yannis reaffirms this criticism, stating that the idea of failed states 
“automatically attributes the entire political responsibility and moral liability for 
state collapse to local communities – generating a moral justification for outside 
intervention to assist ‘those who have failed’” (2002: 818). This assistance is 
motivated by the belief that the state model defined above, liberal democracy, is the 
right model to guarantee international peace and stability. All the literature on fragile 
and collapsed states starts from this background, defining a “normative model of the 
state – a liberal democratic state that is market-friendly, transparent, and 
accountable, with very specific institutional requirements” (Woodward, 2004: 5). 
Underpinning the failed state literature is Western universalism, relegating non-
western states to the position of the deviant other that does not follow the norms of 
what constitutes a successful state (Hill, 2005: 148). 
Despite the criticisms, this discourse has entered the policy-making arena. 
The UN Development Programme (UNDP), for example, holds that there is a general 
consensus on the main features of fragility: fragility is not a fixed state but a 
continuum; fragile contexts are at risk of – or are affected by – crisis and are unable to 
either prevent or recover from one without substantial assistance; in fragile contexts 
public authorities no longer have the monopoly on legitimate violence, the ability to 
deliver services, or the capacity to collect public revenues (UNDP, 2012: 16-17). The 
report thus summarises the mainstream discourse on fragile states and indicates the 
logical conclusion: collapsed states are not able to fix themselves and therefore have 
to be helped by the wider, stable and developed international society. This logic 
provides the necessary excuse for intervention to guarantee a state’s internal stability 
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and the world’s peace and security. As the fragile, failed and collapsed state concepts 
started to emerge at the end of the Cold War, so the UN mechanisms to deal with this 
phenomenon started to be conceptualised at the same time. They were developed in 
accordance with liberal tradition, with liberal peace assumptions at its centre. Next, 
the emergence and development of the UN instruments for the maintenance of 
international peace and security will be analysed. 
 
UNITED NATIONS’ PEACEBUILDING 
The Origin of Peacebuilding 
The peacebuilding concept, as well as the concepts of peacekeeping and 
peacemaking, were already present in academic debates long before the UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali enshrined them in its 1992 “An Agenda for Peace” 
(Ramsbotham, 2000). One of the first authors to use these concepts was Johan 
Galtung. Broadly, he defined peacekeeping as a dissociative approach aimed at 
maintaining the absence of direct violence with the assistance of third parties 
(Galtung, 1976: 282-283). For him, peacemaking is anchored in the conflict resolution 
approach, it “should not only be seen as a way of avoiding war, but also as a way for 
mankind to progress, to transcend incompatibilities or contradictions (…)” (Galtung, 
1976: 290). 
Nevertheless, Galtung considered that to resolve incompatibilities was not 
enough, it was necessary to “turn toward deeper-lying factors in the relation between 
the parties, in order to arrive at some ideas about how a self-supporting resolution 
could be found” (1976: 297). Accordingly, he developed the concept of peacebuilding 
which, in contrast with the idea of peacekeeping, is an associative approach to conflict 
aiming, in an extreme case, at integration. Peacebuilding related direct violence, 
which is first addressed by peacekeeping, to structural violence. The goal was to find 
the structures that can remove the causes of conflict and offer alternatives to it, which 
means finding the structure of peace (Galtung, 1976: 297-298). 
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Underlying these distinctions are Galtung’s (1969, 1990) various definitions 
of violence. He distinguishes between direct, structural and cultural violence. Direct 
violence, as the term implies, targets the individual and is also defined as personal 
violence (Galtung, 1969: 169-172). Structural violence, however, is an indirect form 
of violence, not linked to the subject-object relation; instead, it is built into the 
structure, meaning unequal power relations. Social injustice is thus considered a 
synonym for structural violence (Galtung, 1969: 171). The author later defined a third 
type of violence: cultural violence, which means the “aspects of culture, the symbolic 
sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion, ideology, language and art, 
empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify 
and legitimize direct or structural violence” (Galtung, 1990: 291). 
To different forms of violence, Galtung opposes different types of peace. He 
considers that the idea of peace is attached to three distinct principles. First, the 
concept of peace should represent social goals agreed by large parts of populations; 
second, those social goals can be complex and difficult, but not impossible to attain; 
third, peace should be seen as the absence of violence (Galtung, 1969: 167). This said, 
the absence of direct violence is considered a negative kind of peace and the absence 
of structural violence a positive one. This distinction appears because the “absence of 
personal violence does not lead to a positively defined condition” while the absence of 
structural violence means social justice, which is a positive condition representing an 
egalitarian distribution of power and resources (Galtung, 1969: 183). The triangle of 
violence should be followed by a triangle of peace “in which cultural peace engenders 
structural peace, with symbiotic, equitable relations among diverse partners, and 
direct peace with acts of cooperation, friendliness and love” (Galtung, 1990: 302). 
This theoretical discussion inspired Boutros-Ghali to advance his own 
definition of the different tools available to deal with conflict environments, namely, 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and to add a new instrument 
to those: post-conflict peacebuilding. Nevertheless, his understanding of peace was 
much more limited than the one defined above. Galtung’s peace triangle was reduced 
to Boutros-Ghali’s liberal peace. “An Agenda for Peace” was his response to the 
request of the Security Council to prepare “his analysis and recommendations on 
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ways of strengthening and making more efficient (…) the capacity of the United 
Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping” (UNSC, 1992a: 3) 
in the post-Cold War era. 
Impregnated by the optimism of that period, Boutros-Ghali was convinced 
that a new opportunity had arisen for the achievement of the great goals of the UN 
Charter: the maintenance of international peace and security, the promotion of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the fostering of economic and social 
development (UNSG, 1992: § 3, 5). He, thus, addressed the “ways to improve the 
Organization’s capacity to pursue and preserve peace” (UNSG, 1992: § 6). The first, 
preventive diplomacy, tries to avoid disputes arising between parties, to prevent 
already existing contests from triggering armed conflict and to contain the spread of 
violent conflict; secondly, peacemaking was defined as the action to bring the parties 
of the conflict to an agreement, based on the tools available in Chapter VI of the 
Charter; finally, peacekeeping involves the deployment of a UN presence in the field, 
consented to by the warring parties (UNSG, 1992: § 20). 
Peacebuilding Definition 
Post-conflict peacebuilding is the novelty of this report, which defines it as an 
“action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UNSG, 1992: § 21). After this first 
approach, the idea of peacebuilding kept on being conceptualised in subsequent UN 
reports. Later, peacebuilding was defined as “activities undertaken on the far side of 
conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building 
something that is more than just the absence of war” (UN, 2000: § 13). The precedent 
for peacebuilding with the UN-type intervention came with the operation in Namibia 
(UNTAG), launched in 1989. For the first time, in addition to keeping the ceasefire in 
place, a UN peace operation was mandated to assist with the creation of democratic 
political institutions (Paris, 2004: 22) and to “ensure the early independence of 
Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the 
United Nations” (UNSC, 1989: § 6). 
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The functions attributed to peacebuilding include the “monitoring of human 
rights, electoral reform and social and economic development”, which are recognised 
as “valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has 
occurred” (UNSG, 1995: § 47). Other tasks are disarming and the destruction of arms, 
reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, repatriating refugees, 
strengthening the rule of law, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions 
and training security personal (UNSG, 1992: § 55; UN, 2000: § 13). Most of these 
activities fall within the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and 
agencies of the UN system, attesting to the complexity of these missions (UNSG, 1995: 
§ 53). Peacebuilding, like the other instruments for peace and security, can only be 
employed with the consent of the parties to the conflict, and it requires integrated 
action and delicate dealings with them to prepare the ground before peacebuilding 
activities can be undertaken (UNSG, 1995: § 23, 48). “The top peacebuilding activities 
are those that will enhance peace consolidation, or that will significantly reduce the 
risk of relapse into conflict and begin to resolve key causes of the conflict. Priority-
setting must reflect the unique conditions and the needs of the country (…)” (UNPSO, 
2010: 13). 
Peacebuilding should be seen as a complement to the other tools already 
available to the UN to cope with threats to international peace and security. Once 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping have all been applied to the 
conflict stage they are supposed to address, “only sustained, cooperative work to deal 
with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an 
achieved peace on durable foundation” (UNSG, 1992: § 57) to prevent “the recurrence 
of violence among nations and peoples” (UNSG, 1992: § 21). Post-conflict 
peacebuilding is also seen as a preventive tool since the measures it uses can also 
support preventive diplomacy (UNSG, 1995: § 47). 
The overall objective of peacebuilding, according to Ramsbotham, is to 
construct a self-sustaining peace, designed to overcome the acute problems affecting 
countries subjected to prolonged conflict. Such problems are: political/constitutional 
incapacity, economic/social debilitation, psycho-social trauma and military/security 
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insufficiencies (Ramsbotham: 2000: 174). These are also called peacebuilding 
dimensions. 
The first dimension to be addressed is the military/security one, since it is 
considered that “among the conditions for starting a process of conflict 
transformation and the rebuilding of political institutions, security, and economic 
structures is a secure environment” (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005: 3). Some of the 
responsibilities attributed to peacebuilders are the “reinstallation of order, support 
for local security forces, disarmament of combatants, facilitation of security sector 
reform, protection of elections, demining, and securing the repatriation of refugees 
and protection of human rights” (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005: 3). Rebuilding 
political/constitutional capacity is the task that comes next, intended to set up 
democratic political institutions. Political reconstruction includes: “rewriting a 
constitution (…); crafting new election laws; developing an election infrastructure (…) 
and organizing an election monitoring system with the participation of civil society 
organizations, both to build confidence and monitor the results” (Ottaway, 2002: 
1006). 
Economic recovery is essential to achieve social wellbeing; therefore, another 
dimension of peacebuilding is economic/social reconstruction. This aims at “building 
the institutions and capacity for market-based recovery and employment creation at 
the government level” (Castillo, 2008: 1268) and at addressing “serious 
macroeconomic imbalances and monetary and fiscal management issues with the 
weak bureaucracies, insufficient technical capabilities, and serious financing 
constraints” (Castillo, 2008: 1266). The psycho-social dimension is the least 
developed, but some efforts have been made to reconcile post-conflict societies and 
address the psychological consequences of war through transitional justice. This 
involves a number of internationally, nationally, and/or locally rooted peacebuilding 
measures, such as international tribunals, amnesties, truth commissions, criminal 
trials, reparation programmes and memorials (Parent, 2010: 277). 
The first missions to receive a mandate to undertake similar tasks were 
Cambodia (UNTAC), Somalia (UNOSOM I) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR), all established in 
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1992 (Bellamy et al., 2010). The mandate establishing UNTAC, for example, clearly 
stated that “free and fair elections are essential to produce a just and durable 
settlement to the Cambodia conflict, thereby contributing to regional and 
international peace and security” (UNSC, 1992b). Peace operations were “now seen to 
provide the basis for the institutionalisation of a new peace based on 
democratisation, human rights, development, and economic reform, managed in an 
institutionalised setting by the UN” (Richmond, 2007a: 96). 
Peacebuilding Reforms 
The evolution of peacebuilding missions and their growth in number, as well 
some failures in maintaining peace such as happened in Angola, Rwanda and Sudan, 
for example, described some deficiencies in the peacebuilding architecture. The UN 
has been trying to deal with these flaws, although it has not always been successful, as 
some of the institution’s reports show. The “Brahimi Report”5, was one of the first 
documents to address these problems. The report conducted an overview of the 
previous 10 years of peace operations and concluded that the UN had systematically 
failed to meet the challenge of maintaining international peace and security and that 
it could not do better without serious reform (UN, 2000: § 1). 
The Panel considered that for complex operations to be successful the 
organisation needed to strengthen both the quality and quantity of support provided 
by the member states. It recommended focusing on: clear, credible and adequately 
resourced mandates; more effective collection and assessment of information; 
improved headquarters planning for peace operations, and acquisition of the capacity 
to deploy more complex operations rapidly and sustain them effectively (UN, 2000: § 
6). Some of these problems will be addressed in similar documents, especially the 
issue of financing peace operations and the adequacy of mandates (see, for example, 
UN, 2004: § 214; UNSG, 2005: § 111). Another issue raised by the Panel was the need 
for deeper institutionalisation of peacebuilding missions’ management, therefore 
they suggested the creation of a Peacebuilding Unit within the Department of Political 
                                                             
5 Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria, was the Chairman of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations that produced the report (UN, 2000: Annex I). 
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Affairs of the institution (UN, 2000: § 143). The lack of institutionalisation of 
peacebuilding would also be mentioned in subsequent reports, as we will see next. 
A 2004 report stated that peace operations had been the operational face of 
the UN since the end of the Cold War, nevertheless, it recognised the failures of the 
organisation in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and called on the 
international community to be more vigilant in order to act preventively and to react 
when prevention fails (UN, 2004: § 84-88). The report endorsed three important 
ideas. First, it defended preventive deployment in cases where conflicts are emerging, 
but also as a preventive tool (UN, 2004: § 104-105). Second, it affirmed the use of 
military force as a vital component of any workable system of collective security, 
when legally and properly applied (UN, 2004: § 183). Finally, it acknowledge the need 
for “a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to 
monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by 
donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial 
resources for sustainable peace” (UN, 2004: § 225). 
To bridge this institutional gap it proposed the creation of a Peacebuilding 
Commission. This Commission would be “explicitly designed to avoid State collapse 
and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace” (UN, 
2004: § 261). The Commission would be accompanied by a Peacebuilding Support 
Office established in the Secretariat of the UN, which would ensure effective 
integration of peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and 
provide cohesive support for field operations (UN, 2004: § 266). One year later, the 
Secretary-General also suggested the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission and a 
Peacebuilding Support Office in order to address the need to have, within the UN 
system, a body responsible for peacebuilding (UNSG, 2005: § 114). 
The UN Security Council and the General Assembly would accept these 
recommendations in that year, 20056, with a decision to establish the Peacebuilding 
Commission as an intergovernmental body (UNSC, 2005: § 1; UNGA, 2005b: § 1), 
whose main purposes were 
                                                             
6 Resolutions S/RES/1645 and A/RES/60/180. 
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To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on 
and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and 
recovery; to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building 
efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development 
of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundations for sustainable 
development; to provide recommendations and information to improve the 
coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to 
develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early 
recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the 
international community to post-conflict recovery (UNSC, 2005: § 2; UNGA, 
2005b: § 2). 
Despite this institutional advance, the problems affecting peacebuilding have 
not been erased. In 2010, the organisation acknowledged the main challenges to 
peacebuilding to be: the financial challenge – that prevents a quick response to 
emerging conflict; the challenge of coordination at different levels; the challenge of 
communication – efficiently transmitting the mission’s capacities and adjusting 
expectations (UNPSO, 2010: 16-22). 
Peacebuilding and the Liberal Peace 
A striking feature of all peace missions deployed by the UN since the 1990s is 
that they “pursued the same general strategy for promoting stable and lasting peace 
in war-shattered states: democratization and marketization” (Paris, 2004: 19). This 
strategy prompted some authors to qualify peacebuilding with the prefix of liberal. 
Newman et al., for example, define liberal peacebuilding as “the promotion of 
democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions 
associated with ‘modern’ states as a driving force for building ‘peace’” (2009: 3). 
According to Richmond, there is a clear conception of what type of peace 
should be the end result of UN peacebuilding operations (2007: 105). Most 
international agencies engaged with peacebuilding follow the same paradigm when 
structuring their work, thereby contributing to the consolidation of a peacebuilding 
consensus. This consensus has been creating a regime of truth about peace, spreading 
the generalised idea that the surest way to reach sustainable and lasting peace is by 
promoting market democracy, both within and between states, that is, by fostering a 
liberal democratic polity and a market oriented economy (Paris, 1997; Richmond, 
2007a). Liberal peacebuilding not only embraces democracy and market economics, 
it promotes a wide range of liberal practices and values, such as secular authority, 
-32- 
 
capacity-building, centralised governance, institutions of justice, liberal human rights 
and the integration of societies into globalisation (Newman et al., 2009: 12). 
The UN considers that the immediate post-conflict period offers an 
opportunity to build confidence in the political process and strengthen national 
capacity, so it is important to help restore core government functions (UNSG, 2009: § 
3, 17). Because of this emphasis on the reshaping of the state, some authors7 have 
started to associate peacebuilding with statebuilding, which is premised on the belief 
that the “political process in non-western states can be extremely influenced through 
the promotion of institutional changes introduced at the state level” (Chandler, 2006: 
48). Statebuilding means building “effective public institutions that, through 
negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing 
within the rule of law” (UN, 2004: § 229). Peace is thus equated with governance and 
is based on a methodological reordering of the institutions of the state (Richmond, 
2006: 299). 
“Liberal peacebuilding is premised upon the idea that democracy and a free 
economy encourage people to resolve and express their differences peacefully and 
that this is the best foundation for development and accountable governance” 
(Newman, 2009: 39). Peacebuilding, and its approach to the state, reflects the liberal 
assumptions discussed at the beginning of this chapter, thus endorsing a particular 
peace: the liberal peace. This is related to the belief that states constituted on a liberal 
basis are more peaceful, developed and concerned with humanitarian issues being 
better managed than non-democracies (Newman et al., 2009: 11). These are the core 
values of liberal peace theory, based, as was defined by Kant, on the constitutional, 
international and cosmopolitan sources of law that together connect the 
characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustainable peace (Doyle, 2005: 
463). 
In brief, liberal peace clearly favours the Western experience of peacemaking, 
since it is based on a clear ontological, epistemological and normative agenda that 
assumes a universal character and legitimates intervention based on a hierarchical 
                                                             
7 For example, Paris, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Chesterman et al, 2005; Ghani et al., 2006. 
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relationship which gives Western states the power to fix ‘abnormal’ political, social 
and economic practices (Richmond, 2006: 295-296, 304-306). This specific form of 
peace has become generally accepted by the international community and 
peacebuilding operations represent its operational face. Nevertheless, the concept 
has not attracted full consensus, and a number of critical voices have been 
commenting on its association with peacebuilding. The span of criticisms of liberal 
peace and liberal peacebuilding will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
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2ND CHAPTER | LIBERAL PEACE CRITIQUES 
The previous chapter examined the ideological contextualisation and the 
historical evolution of the concept of peacebuilding. As this practice of peace 
implementation became more frequent, some critiques on its operation and its 
ideological content started to emerge. This chapter reviews the different types of 
critiques and remarks related to peacebuilding and the liberal peace project. 
United Nations peace operations increased dramatically at the end of the 
Cold War, with the same number of operations deployed between 1985 and 1991 as 
were deployed from 1945 to 1985. This increase was due to the belief that, if quickly 
deployed with the consent of the belligerent parties, UN interventions could create 
the conditions for peace to flourish (Durch, 1992: 9). The mission mandates were 
more ambitious than before and the end of Cold War removed the obstacles to the 
organisation acting as a facilitator for peace transition. However, these operations 
exposed the international community’s relative inexperience in dealing with post-
conflict stabilisation (Paris and Sisk, 2009a: 6). 
Scholarship on this subject was also nascent: “the literature provided 
detailed description of particular operations and countries, offering little systematic, 
cross-case analysis, or theorizing about the strategies or nature of the peacebuilding 
enterprise” (Paris and Sisk, 2009a: 6). The first set of critiques of peacebuilding 
missions appeared during this period and were mainly directed at the results of the 
first missions deployed. A brief analysis of UN intervention in post-conflict territories 
in the 1990s showed that the goals initially proposed by those missions’ mandates 
were not being totally accomplished and that lasting peace was not being secured. 
The problems highlighted were mostly related to efficiency issues, with critiques 
being divided between those levelled at the actor and the missions and those aimed at 
the paradigm (Cravo, 2013). 
The critiques of the actor and the missions indicated the severe limitations of 
the UN structure to deal with post-conflict situations and questioned its capacity to 
carry out the necessary peace missions. It was evident at the time that the request for 
UN involvement in conflict prone countries would be greater than the Organisation’s 
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ability to respond, especially given the lack of resources available (Mayall, 1996: 1). 
The assets available to carry out peace missions were a major worry in the 1990s but 
other critiques were being addressed to the UN: shortage of qualified and 
experienced human resources; communication and coordination difficulties between 
the mission in the field and the UN bureaucratic apparatus; poor information 
gathering; mission length, and an absence of exit strategies (Mayall, 1996: 19-20; 
Cravo, 2013: 25-26). Another problem exposed was the drafting of unrealistic 
mandates as a result of organisational inexperience (Mayall, 1996: 19). It was also 
being recognised that peace implementation success was dependent on the difficulty 
of the local environment and the willingness of international actors to define a 
particular case as a security interest (Downs and Stedman, 2002: 44). 
The critiques of the paradigm tried to show that the strategy of promoting 
liberal democracy and market economy was flawed since these assumptions could 
exacerbate the aspects they were trying to contain - violence and poverty - and act as 
destabilisers for the societies in question (Cravo, 2013: 27). Democracy and 
capitalism share a conflict prone character, both of them incentivise societal 
competition to achieve political stability and economic growth. Post-conflict states 
usually lack the institutional structures needed to channel internal disputes in 
peaceful ways; it can therefore be counter-productive to foster market democracy in 
this context (Paris, 1997: 57). Paris (1997: 58) proposes to address this problem 
through a “strategic liberalisation”, sharing the aim of market democracy but 
developing peacebuilding mechanisms that control the effects of economic and 
political liberalisation. 
As the theorisation on the liberal peace model and UN peace missions’ 
performance developed, the obstacles facing peace consolidation became clearer 
(Cravo, 2013: 29). Nevertheless, Paris noted that the “students of peacebuilding have 
concentrated so intently on the operational details of these missions that they have 
tended to neglect the role that peace operations play in the diffusion of norms and 
institutional models from one part of the international system to another” (2002: 
638). This warning represents the shift from the first generation of critics, interested 
in more pragmatic efficiency based criticisms, to a type of critique that is more 
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concerned with the ideological content of peacebuilding missions, that is, liberal 
peace. Therefore, with the evolution of peacebuilding practices during the early 
2000s, scholarship started to develop more theoretical approaches and systematic 
cross-case comparisons of peacebuilding missions (Paris and Sisk, 2009a: 7). 
The different positions taken by academics started to be catalogued in two 
major groups: the problem-solvers and the critics. This distinction was first made by 
Robert Cox (1981), who considered that problem-solving theory  
Takes the world as it finds it, with prevailing social and power relationships 
and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework 
for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these 
relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with 
particular sources of trouble (Cox, 1981: 128-129). 
In contrast, critical theory is “critical in the sense that it stands apart from the 
prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about” (Cox, 1981: 129). 
These divergent attitudes towards liberal peace have profound consequences for the 
analysis of UN’s peace missions, their goals and results. The literature review on this 
subject will be based on this theoretical distinction. It starts with the problem-solvers 
and their analysis of the importance, but also of the weaknesses, that current 
peacebuilding and liberal peace concepts, with their focus on statebuilding, present. 
Next, the critics’ analysis of the liberal peace and peace missions will be reviewed, 
emphasising the power relations they promote and their universalising character. 
Special emphasis will be given to the critique of the relationship between the 
international and the local. 
 
THE PROBLEM-SOLVERS 
The problem-solvers’ critics evaluate the problems associated with the 
liberal peace paradigm without rejecting its liberal character. Their goal is to isolate 
specific problems within the liberal peace framework and contribute to their 
resolution in order to consolidate and strengthen peacebuilding missions. “While 
upholding the values of democracy and the free market aspirationally, these critics 
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argue against the liberal peace approach on the basis that it is unsuitable in the 
context of post-conflict states and situations of state failure” (Chandler, 2010: 142). 
The state is key in problem-solvers’ analysis of the causes of conflict and the 
development of peace processes, and so these authors usually subscribe to the 
discourse on failed states described in the first chapter. They consider that this 
phenomenon is not only a question of humanitarian concern but also a matter of 
international security, which affects the interests of powerful states (Krasner, 2004: 
93-94; Einsiedel, 2005: 13-14). Fukuyama (2004: 124-125) warns that where the 
internal governance of states is inadequate and leads to development problems, this 
has a profound effect on the concept of sovereignty and the Westphalian system, 
constituting a problem to all the members of the international system. Following this 
logic, Chesterman et al. (2005a: 359) argue that “[a] world of capable, efficient and 
legitimate states will help to achieve the goals of order, stability and predictability 
and promote national and human security”. Therefore, they conclude that only 
through an evaluation of the state as a network of institutions can we properly 
understand, address and, probably, avoid crises in governance (Chesterman et al., 
2005a: 362). 
The centrality that the state has in problem-solvers’ reflections is related to 
the importance given to state structures by international actors engaged in 
peacebuilding activities. According to Paris, peacebuilding missions are globalising 
the idea of what a state should look like and how it should act. He considers that 
besides trying to transform failed states into liberal market democracies, these 
missions aim at reconstructing state structures, that is, building “(…) centralised 
administrations that exercise exclusive authority over a bounded territory (…)” 
(Paris, 2002: 654). To achieve this goal, failed states have been submitted to an 
“international imperial power” (Fukuyama, 2004: 131) that assumed governance 
functions in many of these places. Fearon and Laitin (2004: 7) define the relationship 
between the global North and the global South as “neotrusteeship”, which involves 
wide control of domestic political authority and economic functions by foreign actors. 
Paris (2002: 651) considers that peacebuilding represents a contemporary version of 
the mission civilisatrice since Western states clearly assume that liberal market 
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democracy is the most appropriate model of domestic governance for post-conflict 
states. 
This characterisation of the peacebuilding framework does not mean that 
these authors are against this model or reject international intervention in war-
shattered states: on the contrary, problem-solvers consider that the international 
community should have an active role in solving the problems of failed states and 
strongly support intervention in these countries (Krasner, 2004: 86; Chesterman et 
al., 2005a: 372). Fearon and Laitin (2004: 7) clearly state that “whether the problem 
is a failed state or a rogue regime that has been attacked and destroyed, statebuilding 
efforts led by major powers and international organizations are practically 
inevitable”. Nevertheless, problem-solvers recognise that peacebuilding missions are 
not free of problems and sometimes disagree as to how those interventions should be 
handled and what priorities should be defined in peacebuilding missions. 
Ghani et al. (2006) set out four reasons why the international community is 
unable to deal effectively with the challenge of failing states. First, there is a need to 
analyse the common patterns of persistent conflict in war-shattered countries. 
Second, the international community has to recognise the type of transition required 
for a persistent conflict to evolve into sustainable peace in order to develop a strategy 
of statebuilding. Third, the functions of a legitimate state, both at home and abroad, 
should be clearly delineated. Finally, the building of functioning states has not been 
the goal of international community politics and therefore some interventions have 
had the perverse effect of undermining some statebuilding programmes (Ghani et al., 
2006: 102-103). Chesterman et al. (2005a) also stress that the humanitarian system 
is not prepared to deal with the conflicts it is addressing; a change in tactics is 
needed, along with greater involvement in politics. Providing assistance without a 
political strategy might reinforce the dynamics that led to conflict in the first place. 
Furthermore, they consider that there is a lack of coercive tools to deal with state 
weakness (Chesterman et al., 2005a: 375-381). 
Paris and Sisk (2009b) also outline some of the core contradictions of 
peacebuilding missions, with a special emphasis on statebuilding. The contradictions 
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are: (1) using outside intervention to foster self-government; (2) requiring 
international control to establish local ownership; (3) promoting universal values as a 
remedy for local problems; (4) underestimating the persistence and resilience of the 
deeply ingrained patterns of political and economic life; (5) promoting short-term 
imperatives that often conflict with longer-term objectives (Paris and Sisk, 2009b: 
305-306). Chesterman et al. (2005a: 362-370) stress some of the difficulties that 
peacebuilders face: (1) questions of legitimacy – what is the best institutional 
arrangement for a given country; (2) ownership – avoid international protectorate 
while finding the balance between decentralisation of power and the creation of a 
centralised state; (3) political parties – can help the process of institutionalisation of 
power but they also might transfer inter-group conflict to institutions; (4) regional 
influences – neighbouring countries are involved in trade and social networks that 
can be important both to understand the flow of resources into the conflict country 
and to ensure that peace can last. 
In order to surmount these problems and help create a more coherent and 
effective peace/statebuilding strategy, problem-solving authors make some 
suggestions as to how the international community should act towards collapsed 
states. Paris proposes “Institutionalization Before Liberalization” (2004: 179). He 
considers that a rapid liberalisation process can undermine a fragile peace. The core 
recommendation is that a framework of effective institutions should be constructed 
prior to promoting political and economic competition. Liberalisation should be 
delayed and political and economic freedoms should be limited in the short run, “in 
order to create conditions for a smoother and less hazardous transition to market 
democracy” (Paris, 2004: 188). Chesterman at al. (2005b: 2) also consider that the 
“creation of apolitical bureaucratic structures supported by an ideology that 
legitimates the role of neutral state authority in maintaining social order through 
prescribed procedures and the rule of law” is the most important requirement for 
making states work. Different institutional arrangements and local variables should 
be explored in order to maximize the prospects for liberal democracy and market 
economy to emerge and consolidate (Chesterman et al., 2005a: 365). 
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Some authors argue that the International Community should have a greater 
involvement in fixing collapsed states. Fearon and Laitin (2004: 21), for example, 
consider that “exit without a return to war demands some level of sustained 
transitional administration by international parties”. The problem of state weakness 
needs an international collective action solution. Intervention is inevitable and must 
be shared across a wide range of states, international non-governamental 
organisations (NGOs) and corporations (Fearon and Laitin, 2004: 41). This reality 
means that an effective state must be constructed before international interveners 
leave the country, in order to sustain peace and provide order (Fearon and Laitin, 
2004: 36). Krasner goes a bit further and advocates shared sovereignty arrangements 
(2004: 85). He argues that the national authority of the state should be shared with 
international actors that would bear responsibility for some aspects of domestic 
sovereignty (Krasner, 2004: 89). “National actors would use their international legal 
sovereignty to enter into agreements that would compromise their 
Westphalian/Vatelian sovereignty with the goal of improving domestic sovereignty” 
(Krasner, 2004: 108). In more serious cases he considers that international actors 
should even consider de facto trusteeships or protectorates (Krasner, 2004: 89). 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, problem-solving authors 
critique the liberal peace model and peacebuilding development but they do not 
question their existence and principles. According to Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 
766-767) problem-solvers are concerned with solving immediate problems and are 
generally incurious about the wider structural factors that might have led to those 
problems. These authors follow the logic of the dominant paradigm that structures 
the liberal peace; their goal is not to confront the liberal model but, on the contrary, to 
reinforce it. Their work has contributed to the maintenance of the liberal peace 
framework and its suggestions have just anchored it more firmly. The aim of 
problem-solvers is to help the global North and its institutionalised power system to 
force the global South to follow the principles of liberal market democracy. Their 
work is mainly policy orientated and many problem-solver scholars have links to the 
policy world (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 767). The academic work they have 
been producing represents, besides the contributions to maximise the effectiveness of 
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peacebuilding missions, an important legitimacy tool for the action of global North 
actors towards post-conflict states. 
 
THE CRITICS 
Critical theory emerged in the years that separated the two World Wars and 
was influenced by the historical events of the time and by the European political 
landscape. Socialism and Social Democracy, Communism and class conflict were 
gaining momentum and social scientists were influenced by new ideas spreading 
across Europe (Held, 1990: 16-19). David Held identifies the Frankfurt School as the 
founders and main contributors of critical theory, with Max Horkheimer, Friedrich 
Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Leo Lowenthal; and Jürgen Habermas 
(1990: 14-15). These authors aimed to “lay the foundations for an exploration, in an 
interdisciplinary research context, of questions concerning the conditions which 
make possible the reproduction and transformation of society, the meaning of 
culture, and the relation between the individual, society and nature” (Held, 1990: 16). 
Critical theorists wanted to contribute to a critique of ideology and to the 
development of non-authoritarian and non-bureaucratic politics through the 
examination of contemporary social and political issues. 
As mentioned above, the idea of critical theory as opposed to problem-
solving theory was first problematised by Robert Cox. According to him, “[c]ritical 
theory (…) does not take institutions and power relations for granted but calls them 
into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might 
be in the process of change” (Cox, 1981: 129). The relevance of each theory is, 
therefore, determined by their relationship with existing structures of power, and the 
principal aim of critical theory is to challenge the supposed “naturalness” of the 
international system’s current power relations (Duvall and Varadarajan, 2003: 77, 
81). Critical writings about liberal peace and peace missions accept this logic of 
exposing the relations of power that underlie the liberal peace and peacebuilding. 
Critical authors tend “to see the discourse of liberal peace as an ideological and 
instrumental one, arguing that the rhetoric of freedom, markets and democracy is 
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merely a representation of Western self-interest, which has little genuine concern for 
the security and freedoms of those societies intervened in” (Chandler, 2010: 139). 
The purposes and value of critical theory have often been questioned by 
more conservative authors8 who accuse critical theory of not having practical 
relevance. Before describing the critiques put forward by these authors, it is 
important to draw attention to the value of critique. Critical theory, when exposing 
the power arrangements prevalent in the international system, is making room to 
challenge these dominant structures through both academic/theoretical and practical 
political resistance (Duvall and Varadarajan, 2003: 78). Critical theory is framed by a 
certain “guide” for action; it aims at having a practical relevance and therefore 
constitutes a “policy tool for those who are involved in challenging, confronting, and 
disrupting existing relations of power” (Duvall and Varadarajan, 2003: 84-85). 
Among the critical authors of liberal peace we can find very different types of 
critique and also very different positions on whether the liberal peace has some 
principles that should be recovered or if it should simply be put aside. Critical theory 
is definitely not a homogeneous body, nevertheless, all the main critiques developed 
on the liberal peace system and peace missions go beyond identifying efficiency 
challenges and serve to expose the domination patterns that underlie these missions. 
In the domain of peace, critical theory is influenced by peace studies. Peace 
studies was first proposed as a discipline by Johan Galtung with the aim of seeking a 
“general and complete peace” based on the reduction of violence to zero and relations 
of integration, cooperation and harmony to encompass the whole world (Galtung, 
1964: 1-2). This general and complete peace would entail both the negative and the 
positive peaces defined in the first chapter. Critical authors, when discussing the 
power relations that structure liberal peace, and UN peace missions share the goal of 
exposing the limited character that the application of liberal peace takes on compared 
with the understanding of peace defined by Galtung, since the liberal peace fails to 
firmly confront direct, structural and cultural violence. 
                                                             
8 As an example: Keohane (1989) International Institutions: Two Approaches and Waltz (1997) Theory 
of International Politics. 
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This said, the main general critique of liberal peace is its hegemonic 
character. The development of liberal peace is, as demonstrated in the first chapter, 
contextual and reflects Western interests in the preservation and advancement of the 
contemporary order (Richmond, 2004: 91). Nevertheless, this concept has been 
represented as universal by the international community of liberal states, 
disregarding the fact that liberal peace and its missions are a product of long-term 
evolution and the reflection of specific experiences, interests and perspectives 
(Richmond, 2007b: 247-248). This logic has also been followed by international 
relations theorists who have paid little attention to the importance of peace support 
operations in sustaining particular forms of global governance norms (Pugh, 2004: 
39). According to Jabri, peacebuilding has a hegemonic status among both 
international actors and knowledge production actors, and is a major scientific 
research programme. Its hegemony is, therefore, “manifest institutionally and as a 
‘norm’, it is manifest as a scientific programme and, furthermore, in its capacity to 
transcend distinctions” (Jabri: 2013: 5). 
Peacebuilding and statebuilding are currently at the centre of Western states’ 
foreign policy concerns, and international organisations’ and NGOs’ practice. This 
general consensus on the centrality of the liberal peace was favoured by the belief 
that its norms and governance frameworks are generally accepted. This creates 
hierarchical relations that are supported by the ideological hegemony of 
contemporary forms of liberalism: “(…) liberal epistemic communities of 
peacebuilders transfer governance regimes through a process of conditional funding, 
training and dependency creation to the more ‘primitive’ recipients in conflict zones” 
(Richmond, 2009: 62). The logic of liberal peace is now endorsed in almost every 
relation between the international community and non-western states through 
conditionality mechanisms that endorse liberal values such as democracy, the rule of 
law and free markets (Chandler, 2006: 3-4). According to Duffield “[t]he aim of the 
liberal peace is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it 
encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable 
entities” (2007: 11). 
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Liberal peace is not only a projection of power, it is the enforcement of a 
particular ensemble of ideas, values and political purposes, too (Chandler, 2006: 18). 
Liberal peace is part of a global liberal governance network that joins state and non-
state, military and civilian, public and private actors in the pursuit of an agenda of 
social transformation with the goal of obtaining global stability (Duffield, 2007: 12). 
According to Fetherston, liberal peace constitutes a structure of power that aims to 
discipline and normalise the spaces affected by conflict in order to render them ready 
to accept the liberal and neo-liberal forms of social, economic and political 
organisation (2000: 200). The author inscribes the liberal peace framework in the 
project of modernity which she considers produces a discourse of truth that aims for 
“total knowledge, total power, total enlightenment, the end of history, and 
simultaneously, the end of difference” (Fetherston, 2000: 190). Pugh also argues that 
peace support operations are not neutral and that, actually, they serve the purposes 
of an existing order within which adjustments can occur with the goal of controlling 
the unruly parts of the world and consolidating the liberal peace (2004: 41). 
Related to this vision of the liberal peace as a hegemonic concept is the fact 
that international actors and mainstream international relations academics barely 
recognise that peace is actually a contested concept. Peace is presented as obviously 
meaning democracy, marketisation, human rights, the rule of law and development. 
This ideal form allows the intervention of international actors in places where this 
peace is not present (Richmond, 2007b: 251, 263). International intervention in 
conflict and post-conflict states that is justified by this ideal and universal form of 
peace is another widely debated issue among the critics. Pugh considers that liberal 
peace is represented as desirable and the ethical response to conflict, and so 
intervention in the name of peace is seen as a positive endeavour with the moral goal 
of maintaining order and security in the international system (2004: 48). This is so 
that the main international organisations see their role in the contribution to 
international peace in terms of peacebuilding, which now amounts to a norm in the 
international system, thereby legitimising particular types of intervention (Jabri, 
2013: 4). 
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Because the liberal peace establishes models of governance in the main 
political, economic and social areas that are claimed to be universal and consensual, 
conditions were created for an epistemic community of states, international 
organisations and NGOs to intervene in order to direct reforms in post-conflict states 
in accordance with that general consensus (Richmond, 2009: 56-57). The logic is that 
post-conflict spaces are fragile and potentially dangerous and therefore intervention 
is necessary to cope with human suffering and the inefficiency of the state in question 
(Duffield, 2007: 114-115; Jabri, 2013: 11). The legitimisation of intervention is 
accompanied by a certain degree of paternalism, since the states in question are seen 
as incapable of acting in a responsible manner and protecting the most fundamental 
rights of their citizens (Chandler, 2004a: 63). Richmond considers that peacebuilding 
implies the “(…) transference of enlightened knowledge to those who lack the 
capacity or morality to attain such knowledge themselves” (2007: 268). 
This paternalist aspect of liberal peace is closely related to the fact that 
conflict is not seen as having a political nature or political goals; at the same time, the 
solutions presented by the international community are also exclusively discussed in 
purely technical and functionalist terms (Chandler, 2006: 6). Thus, peacebuilding is 
approached as a fundamentally practical challenge: peace is achievable if the right 
steps are taken (Newman, 2009: 42). This happens because “(…) conflict is largely not 
interpreted in terms of political contestation, but primarily as a matter of the failure 
of government” (Jabri, 2013: 10). The corollary of the negation of politics is the idea 
that the “ungoverned” populations can be better governed with the help of external 
experts and capacity-builders, disregarding the importance of politics, self-
government and political autonomy (Chandler, 2006: 7; Jabri, 2013: 14). When 
analysing the question of politics and global South conflict, Duffield argues that there 
is a crucial distinction between seeing the conflict as conducive to social regression or 
as a force of social transformation. For him, conflict can represent “sites of innovation 
and reordering resulting in the creation of new types of legitimacy and authority” 
(Duffield, 2007: 6). 
With politics put aside, the goal of peace support operations is to build 
capacities for governance so that social collapse and possible conflict are prevented. 
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That said, the political authority of those who govern is related to their capacity to 
govern well and in accordance with international standards (Jabri, 2013: 12, 14). 
Sovereignty is, thus, reconceptualised as capacity instead of an indivisible right, 
becoming a duty. This is how a new international hierarchy of different levels of 
sovereignty is created; nevertheless, sovereignty maintains its legal and formal 
importance, conferring on relations of domination the label of partnership between 
formally two equal partners (Chandler, 2008: 344). The result is that external 
regulation is not seen as intervention any more, instead, it serves to empower and 
strengthen the states subjected to intervention since it helps to enhance their 
governance capacities and, consequently, their sovereignty (Chandler, 2006: 36). 
Duffield considers that northern governments have found new ways of reasserting 
their authority through new systems of governance that still reflect the South’s 
subordination (2007: 8). 
Another important set of critiques is related to the performance of the UN 
and the discrepancy between the goals of liberal peace and peacebuilding and its 
results. The international community has been practising reform and conflict 
resolution in war-torn countries with clear ineffectiveness (Fetherston: 2000: 201). 
Several problems of liberal peacebuilding are pointed out: democratisation can 
further violence, especially in ethnic conflicts; liberal human rights can be culturally 
inappropriate or contested; the rule of law can mask inequity and be enforced 
without the population’s consent and with disregard for its social needs (Chandler, 
2004b: 579; Richmond, 2009: 61). Neo-liberal economy and development create 
exclusion among international capitalist relationships, since post-conflict states are 
not able to compete in international markets, and at the same time they marginalise 
the needy and deepen poverty (Pugh, 2004: 46; Chandler, 2006: 14-15; Richmond, 
2009: 61). Richmond and Franks also stress that peacebuilding missions do not get to 
the rural and isolated areas of post-conflict countries, which creates asymmetries 
between rural and urban areas (2009: 188). 
According to Richmond, the UN’s performance “has proven to be highly 
ambitious, often resulting in a ‘virtual peace’ based upon contested attempts to 
import liberal democratic models via military intervention, and political, social, and 
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economic institution building and reconstruction” (2007: 265). He adds that “peace 
through governance reproduces the empty shell of the state with only marginal 
qualitative impact on the lives of its inhabitants” (Richmond, 2007b: 265). Chandler 
talks about ‘phantom states’, when looking at the results of statebuilding (Chandler, 
2006: 41). States retain their legal status as countries but have no capacity to be 
independent political subjects capable of self-government. The fact that the liberal 
peace is endorsed through force, coercion, conditionality or dependency by outsiders 
results in institutions and frameworks that do not affect the individuals in the short 
and medium term (Richmond, 2009: 56). 
The concept of good governance and the model of state endorsed by 
peacebuilding missions are also highly debated. This is related to the critique of the 
concept of failed states. According to Jabri, the causes of conflict are portrayed as 
being related to institutional government and, therefore, intervention is directed at 
correcting the failure of states in order to establish the governance structures 
necessary for working states that can govern internally and participate in the 
international system (2013: 9-10). Richmond considers that intervention has been 
serving to construct Westphalian states that mimic the values associated with liberal 
states. Peacebuilding tries to recreate a “(…) state-centric order, territorial integrity 
and basic human rights, while also attempting to institutionalize political, social and 
economic reform according to the precepts of the democratic peace” (Richmond, 
2004: 92). For Chandler, however, the focus on the state does not aim at constructing 
self-governing, independent and autonomous political subjects; on the contrary, the 
idea is to place responsibility on the intervened state even as it loses its policy-
making authority (2006: 31). 
The Local Turn 
Underlying all the critiques presented is the problem of the relationship 
between international and local actors. Critical authors generally agree that there is a 
disconnection between the international understandings of war and peace and local 
perspectives (Fetherston, 2000: 195; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 764). This 
arises from the ignorance of local cultures demonstrated by international agents and 
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their neglect as part of the political, economic and social institutional framework of 
the intervened societies, which results in the perception that peacebuilding 
undermines local interests and needs (Richmond, 2009: 68). Duffield (2007: 123) 
sees the lack of connection with local cultures as an intentional endeavour, since, 
according to him, the liberal peace is hostile to traditional societies. Conflict has, 
therefore, the wider positive effect of eroding the cohesion of culture, customs and 
traditions. Thus, “(…) the rolling back of development and the deepening of poverty 
provide the urgency to intervene, the destruction of culture furnishes the opportunity 
for aid agencies to establish new and replacement forms of collective identity and 
social organisation” (Duffield, 2007: 123). 
The detachment of liberal peace from local cultures and practices raises 
legitimacy questions, since the peace provided is the one it is deemed that people 
should have, instead of the peace people might seek for themselves (Roberts, 2012: 
367). Local people are thus excluded from the peace process, which is usually 
negotiated at the elite level, and this often leads to local dissent, dissatisfaction and 
resistance (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 184; Roberts, 2012: 368). The local 
perspective of the international is profoundly negative; it is considered that the 
international is 
(…) [E]ndemically dysfunctional, contextually insensitive, disrespectful and 
distant, unaccountable, interest-based, normatively biased, ideologically 
fixed, mercenary in its naturalisation of capitalism and unwilling to address 
inequality or the historical injustices stemming from colonialism (Mac Ginty 
and Richmond, 2013: 772). 
This disconnection between the international and the local can result in a 
loss of agency on the part of local actors and can lead to international actors failing to 
consider the causes of instability, resistance and, in some cases, ongoing violence 
(Richmond and Mitchell, 2012: 6). 
The difficult relation between international and local actors has been 
receiving growing attention by critical scholars. This is called the “local turn” and is 
the result of the “recognition of the diffuseness of power (…) and its circulation, of the 
importance of culture, history and identity, the significance of local critical agency 
and resistance (…)” (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 769). But the local turn has also 
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operated at the policy-making sphere. International actors started to use concepts 
such as “participation”, “local ownership” and “partnership” in their policy 
documents. This is mainly a rhetorical tool aiming to build local consent and 
legitimacy. The growing assertiveness of local actors and their greater capacity to 
pressure international actors has allowed a clear manifestation of discontent towards 
peacebuilding missions and has been one of the most significant reasons for major 
peacebuilding actors adapting the local turn (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 775). 
Critical authors, who state the importance of the engagement of local people 
and civil society organisations in peace processes, are very sceptical of the local turn 
at the institutional level; they are critical of concepts such as local ownership. 
Richmond (2013) considers that this concept only serves to legitimise the work of 
peacebuilders and enable local agency to develop in a liberal setting. For him, 
concepts like human security, ownership or empowerment are directed at local civil 
society sectors who already share the principles of human rights, development and 
democratisation, as defined by liberal norms, and they do not reach local people in an 
inclusive manner (Richmond, 2012: 355). Furthermore, locals are not allowed to 
choose what they want to own and how ownership can be experienced, since the 
concept is explicitly determined by internationals (Richmond, 2013: 358-359). In 
another study, Richmond and Franks (2009: 181) concluded that peacebuilding “(…) 
is not localised, cannot engage with the non-liberal subject or their needs, and fails to 
build a liberal social contract or develop customary and hybridised understandings of 
a viable, context-driven, rather than internationally or donor-driven, form of peace in 
a local and everyday context”. 
Realising the inability of international actors to engage with local actors in 
peace processes, critical scholars started to explore the results of the confrontation 
between the peace formula developed by internationals and the practices at the local 
level and found hybrid forms of peace. The meeting of the everyday lives of local 
actors affected by conflict with strategies, institutions and norms of liberal 
international intervention results in unique forms of peace (Richmond and Mitchell, 
2012: 1). Hybridity is the product of powerful local critiques and resistance to 
international action, and the perception that peacebuilding is not meeting the 
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expectations (Richmond, 2009: 54). For Roberts (2012: 367) hybridity is “a mix of the 
old and the new, functioning simultaneously, interwoven, overlapping, but with the 
hegemony of the old masked by the rhetoric of the new”. The process of hybridisation 
consists of the reshaping of norms, institutions and activities of both international 
and local actors by means of everyday practices such as verbal interaction, 
organisation and even overt conflict (Richmond and Mitchell, 2012: 1). 
The local is thus seen as a “range of locally based agencies present within a 
conflict and post-conflict environment, some of which are aimed at identifying and 
creating the necessary processes for peace (…)”, instead of the “near empty space, 
willingly subservient to Northern models and interests” (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 
2013: 769) as assumed by international actors. The local is, therefore, a place of 
agency rooted in the everyday. That is,  
The ways people make their lives the best they can, manipulating with 
whatever tools and tactics at their disposal, the surrounding natural, social, 
economic, and political structures, local and global, that empower or 
constrain their lives in the vandalized environment of post-conflict spaces 
(Roberts, 2012: 369). 
According to Richmond and Mitchell (2012: 2) the failure of liberal 
peacebuilding is, in reality, a sign of the success of local agency and its claims for 
autonomy. Liberal peacebuilding often underestimates local capacity but peace 
processes could actually be more successful if they respected and adopted indigenous 
ways (Roberts, 2012: 372). This does not mean romanticising the local, which also 
contains power relations and hierarchies that favour some over others, it only 
recognises its agency and valuable contributions to peace processes (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013: 770). 
Critical authors alert international actors to the hybrid dimension of the 
implantation of liberal peace and the importance of respecting and integrating 
everyday concerns and practices in the peacebuilding structure. Richmond (2009: 73) 
considers that peacebuilding requires, first, international consensus on how it should 
be done, but more importantly, a process of negotiation between the locals and the 
international community, thus allowing a debate about what type of peace is being 
fostered in various conflict zones around the world. Roberts (2012: 368) suggests a 
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popular peace “designed by local societies, furnished externally by international 
society, and mobilised internally through formal and informal institutions”. Popular 
peace is the result of acknowledging, hearing and responding to everyday lives, 
democratising peacebuilding and rendering it genuinely participatory (Roberts, 2012: 
370). Richmond and Mitchell (2012: 33) call for a new approach to peacebuilding, one 
that “examines the unique responses, practices, tactics and agencies that emerge at 
the interface between international peacebuilding actors and local actors with whom 
they engage”, recognising that everyday peace is a unique, dynamic, contextualised 
and contested form of peace. 
I shall recognise the importance of these critical approaches to the local and 
the relevance of using the concept of hybridity in the context of liberal peace analysis. 
Hybrid peace theories perform the hard task of exposing the resistance and 
contestation of local actors towards the imposition of externally formulated recipes 
for peace, which are not context sensitive, or, as these authors put it, sensitive to the 
everyday. These authors’ work, which acknowledges the local actors’ agency, 
constitutes an important tool to question liberal peace and peacebuilding missions. 
Nevertheless, I consider they only emphasise local agency after the point of 
intervention by internationals. Recognising hybrid forms of peace and exploring them 
is important to confront the totalising character of liberal peace, yet, as Roberts 
(2012) puts it, the hybridity produced still carries with it the hegemonic relations 
between the global North and the global South. This said, I believe there is still some 
work to be done to deconstruct liberal peace’s hegemonic relationship with the local. 
My aim, with this dissertation, is to draw attention to the local before 
intervention has occurred. Recognising agency and resistance to local actors implies 
recognising the local as a place of different epistemologies and, therefore, different 
conceptions of peace. Although I endorse the knowledge produced on the local, I 
believe this field of research would profit from seeking and identifying the 
epistemologies that, when confronted with the liberal paradigm of peace typical of 
modern Western thought, produce resistance and thus create hybridity. Identifying 
those epistemologies implies recognising the local as a space of knowledge 
production. This acknowledgement gives visibility to epistemologies ignored until 
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now, deeming them as valuable as Western modern rationality. This way, local 
knowledges and local conceptions of peace acquire renewed strength to contest the 
model of peace fostered by international actors, given that the liberal peace no longer 
benefits from the status of exclusivity. 
For this, I rely on the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, first, to develop an 
epistemological critique of the liberal peace as part of modern Western thinking, and 
afterwards to suggest that the discipline of peace studies should adopt the conceptual 
framework of the epistemologies of the South in order to easily reveal and explore 
local conceptions of peace. His concepts serve to re-establish cognitive justice around 
the world, since they confront the monoculture of hegemonic Western thinking with 
the plurality of knowledges existing in the world. Revealing different forms of peace 
thus allows the creation of new hybrid peaces of a non-hegemonic character. The next 
chapter explores Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ concepts, which are considered 
pertinent to a different view of the local. 
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3RD CHAPTER | EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE SOUTH: INTRODUCING BOAVENTURA DE 
SOUSA SANTOS TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
One of the aims of this dissertation is to advance new conceptual tools that 
can address the diversity of peaces in the world. Although critical theorists identify 
the universal and totalitarian character of liberal peace and its goal of rendering post-
conflict states as close as possible to liberal democracies, ignoring local conceptions 
of peace, I consider these authors address the local only partially. The choice of 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ work arises from this realisation. This author’s 
characterisation of modern Western thinking allows the building of an 
epistemological critique of the liberal peace, thus contributing to a better 
understanding of the hegemonic relationship between peacebuilding and the local. 
Furthermore, he has developed a set of tools that are able to describe the 
epistemological diversity of the world. From my perspective, those tools can be used 
to depict different ways of conceiving peace by confronting the limited character of 
liberal peace with the plurality of endogenously conceived peaces. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos is Professor of Sociology at the University of 
Coimbra and Distinguished Legal Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He 
also directs the Centre for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra. His most recent 
project is “ALICE: Leading Europe to a New Way of Sharing the World Experiences” 
funded by an Advanced Grant from the European Research Council. His work has 
been influenced and inspired by the lives and works of Mahatma Gandhi, Frantz 
Fanon, Toussain L’Ouverture, Patrice Lumumba, Bartolina Sisa, Catarina Eufémia and 
Rosa Parks, among others (Santos, 2014: 2). He has worked closely with Immanuel 
Wallerstein, Arturo Escobar, Walter Mignolo, Maria Paula Menezes and João 
Arriscado Nunes. 
During his long career, Professor Boaventura de Sousa Santos has addressed 
issues such as globalisation, sociology of law and the state, epistemology, post-
colonial theory, democracy, interculturalism, social movements and human rights. He 
has written several books and articles, some of the most important being: “A 
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Discourse on the Sciences” (1992)9, “Towards a New Common Sense: Law, Science 
and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition” (1995), “Porque é Tão Difícil Construir 
uma Teoria Crítica?” (1999), “Democratizing Democracy. Beyond the Liberal 
Democratic Cannon” (2006), “Another Knowledge is Possible. Beyond Northern 
Epistemologies” (2007), “Epistemologias do Sul” (2010a) and “Epistemologies of the 
South: Justice against Epistemicide” (2014) just to name a few titles of his extensive 
work. 
In order to understand Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ concepts and theoretical 
proposals we have to understand his position with respect to modern Western 
thinking. Western modernity is a social and cultural paradigm that developed from 
the sixteenth century onwards and became consolidated in the late eighteenth and 
the early nineteenth centuries (Santos, 2010c: 230). It had its origin in the revolutions 
of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton and led to an unprecedented social and 
technological transformation (Santos, 1992: 11). Western modernity developed a 
single model of scientific rationality, first in the domain of natural sciences and later, 
by the nineteenth century, in the domain of social sciences. This rationality acquired a 
global and totalitarian character since it identified as irrational all forms of 
knowledge that did not follow its epistemological principles and methodological 
rules, namely, common sense and the humanities (Santos, 1995: 11-12). 
The negation of the world’s epistemic variety, caused by the complicity 
between modernity and scientific knowledge, can be considered a form of coloniality. 
The concept of coloniality expresses the epistemic difference between the western 
world and the colonial world that rules the belief in the superiority of western science 
and knowledge, giving origin to the current international power system structured on 
the social classification of the world population based on the idea of “race” (Quijano, 
2002: 4; Mignolo, 2003: 632). Celebrating this scientific revolution as the point of 
arrival for human knowledge had the consequence of negating the non-modern 
humanity the capacity to think (Mignolo, 2003: 632, 634). Therefore, it is not possible 
to conceive of modernity without coloniality. Boaventura de Sousa Santos also shares 
this idea as will be seen later in this chapter. 
                                                             
9 First published in Portuguese in 1987. 
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This conceptual framework suited the interests of the rising bourgeoisie, 
which saw the society it was starting to control as being in the final stage of the 
evolution of mankind (Santos, 1995: 14). Hence, the global and totalitarian character 
of modernity is not explained by the power of its principles but by the fact that a 
particular form of knowledge has coincided with a particular moment in history: the 
emergence of capitalist economy (Mignolo, 2003: 639). The intimate relation of 
Western modernity with the development and expansion of capitalism is one of its 
most important features (Santos, 1994: 84). Also associated with it is the expansion of 
colonialism, another foundation of Western modernity. For Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos these two characteristics of Western modernity are mutually dependent since 
colonialism is a “set of extremely unequal exchanges that depend on denying 
humanity to the weaker people in order to overexploit them or exclude them as being 
discardable” and capitalism is inconceivable without overexploited and discardable 
populations (Santos, 2010c: 233–234). For him, colonialism and capitalism are part of 
the same constellation of powers. 
The disbelief in common sense and the humanities demonstrated by modern 
science is related, on one hand, to the distrust of the evidence of our immediate 
experience and, on the other, to the promotion of total separation between human 
beings and nature. Modern science aims to know nature in order to control it (Santos, 
1992: 14-15). It has, therefore, two main consequences: its scientific method is based 
on the reduction of the complexity of reality and its scientific rigor is gauged by the 
rigor of measurements, signifying that to know means to quantify (Santos, 1995: 13). 
Modern science is “a causal knowledge which aims at formulating laws in the light of 
observed regularities and with a view to foreseeing the future behaviour of 
phenomena” (Santos, 1992: 17). Knowledge in the form of laws aims to achieve order 
and stability in the world, which is a precondition for the technological 
transformation of reality. Modern knowledge is meant to be utilitarian and functional, 
to be valued more for its capacity to produce transformation of reality than for its 
capacity to understand it (Santos, 1995: 14). This is as true for natural sciences as for 
social sciences: if it “had been possible to discover the laws of nature, so would it be 
possible to discover the laws of society” (Santos, 1992: 18). 
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The great novelty of Western modernity was the discrepancy between social 
experiences and social expectations. In fact, according to Western modernity, 
“experience does not have to, and indeed should not, coincide with expectations” 
(Santos, 2014: 138). It starts from the assumption that the experiences of the present 
will be exceeded by the expectations of the future. This excess of expectations of the 
reality of experiences was given the name of progress (Santos, 1999: 210). The 
asymmetry between social experiences and social expectations was rendered normal 
by the two pillars on which Western modernity is based: social regulation and social 
emancipation. Social regulation is constituted by the principles of the state, the 
market and the community10, while social emancipation is formed of the aesthetic-
expressive rationality of literature and the arts, the cognitive instrumental rationality 
of science and technology, and the moral-practical rationality of ethics and law11 
(Santos, 1991: 1). 
The project of Western modernity aimed at the harmonious and reciprocal 
development of both pillars, whereby the harmonisation of potentially incompatible 
social values, such as justice and autonomy, solidarity and identity, and equality and 
freedom, would be ensured (Santos, 2014: 138). This project is both ambitious and 
revolutionary and so its possibilities are endless, producing excessive promises that 
contrast with the shortfall in accomplishment (Santos, 1991: 2). The management of 
the excesses and deficits of Western modernity, which has been entrusted to modern 
science, have caused the collapse of the pillar of emancipation into the pillar of 
regulation (Santos, 1995: 7). This process culminated in the concentration of 
emancipatory energies in the realm of science and technology. Simultaneously, 
because of its relation with science, the principle of the market has progressively 
shrunk the principle of community and colonised the principle of the state (Santos, 
1991: 2-3). 
The two pillars are related to two forms of knowledge: knowledge-as-
regulation – defined along a line between ignorance, seen as chaos, and knowledge, 
consequently meaning order; and knowledge-as-emancipation – conceiving 
                                                             
10 Mainly inspired by the works of Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith and Rousseau, respectively. 
11 The constitution of the pillar of social emancipation is drawn from the work of Weber. 
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ignorance as colonialism, and knowledge as solidarity (Santos, 1999: 205). As Nunes 
helps us understand, the first form of knowledge sees the diversity of modes of 
knowing and intervention in the world as a symptom of chaos, made of irrational pre-
scientific notions that are hostile to modern science and which only this rationality 
can transform in order (2003: 59). For the second, the intention of modern science to 
legislate about other forms of knowing is seen as a colonial manifestation, arising 
from the marginality, discredit or liquidation of everything that does not fit the 
principles of the rationalising order (Nunes, 2003: 59-60). Colonialist ignorance 
refuses to recognise the other as equal and so converts him into an object (Santos, 
2010c: 230). This second form of knowledge opposes this pretension with a solidary 
conception of knowledge, made from coexistence, dialogue and interaction between 
different forms of knowing and experience (Nunes, 2003: 60). 
These two forms of knowledge were supposed to balance each other, 
meaning that knowledge-as-emancipation would be fed by the excesses of order and 
knowledge-as-regulation by the excesses of solidarity (Santos, 2014: 139). The 
growing overlap between the development of Western modernity and the 
development of capitalism led to the total supremacy of knowledge-as-regulation 
over knowledge-as-emancipation: order became the hegemonic way of knowing, 
while chaos became the hegemonic way of ignorance (Santos, 2010c: 231; 2014: 
139). Furthermore, such primacy allowed the reconfiguration of knowledge-as-
emancipation in accordance with knowledge-as-regulation. Thus, colonialism was 
recoded as a form of order, while solidarity was equated with chaos (Santos, 2014: 
139). 
It is important to note that the distinction between social regulation and 
social emancipation ruled only the metropolitan spaces. The colonial territories were 
ruled by the logic of appropriation/violence (Santos, 2010c: 230). “In general, 
appropriation involves incorporation, co-optation, and assimilation, whereas violence 
involves physical, material, culture, and human destruction” (Santos, 2007: 51). While 
the logic of regulation/emancipation that governs metropolitan places was 
unthinkable without the distinction between the law of persons and the law of things, 
the logic of appropriation/violence only recognised the law of things, of both human 
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and nonhuman things (Santos, 2014: 123). Through this process, modern science, 
increasingly at the service of capitalist development, was able to impose itself as 
hegemonic. As a consequence, colonialism as a social relation survived the end of 
colonialism as a political relation (Santos, 1999: 205; 2010c: 231). 
Western modernity, besides seeing its constituting pillars become distorted, 
has also failed to fulfil its promises. The promise of equality remains unaccomplished, 
and inequality has actually been rising among countries and within countries. Liberty 
has not been achieved either; constant manifestations of violations of the most basic 
human rights can be found worldwide, even in formally peaceful countries. Perpetual 
peace is a mirage, every year thousands of people die as victims of conflict. The 
domination of nature led to a severe ecological crisis that largely affects the poorest 
populations in the world (Santos, 1999: 197-199). Western modernity is thus formed 
of a set of modern problems that cannot be solved by modern solutions (Santos, 
2014: 233). That said, Boaventura de Sousa Santos looks at critical theory for 
answers. However, he finds the following perplexity (Santos, 2010b: 7): why has 
critical emancipatory thought, largely traditional in Western culture, in fact not been 
able to emancipate? It seems the global North has little to teach the world and that, in 
reality, colonialism has impaired its ability to accept the existence of other narratives 
beyond the universal history of the West. Surprisingly, Eurocentric critical theory has 
also been affected by this incapacity (Santos, 2014: 19). This reality sends the author 
on the quest for new epistemologies, that he designates the epistemologies of the 
South. 
If modern problems cannot be solved by modern solutions and if both the 
modern paradigm and critical theory face a common crisis, the time might have come 
for different paradigms to be developed. According to the author, to find solutions to 
modern problems we must reinvent social emancipation. He starts from the premise 
that cultural diversity and epistemological diversity are reciprocally embedded, and, 
therefore, he looks to replace the monoculture of scientific knowledge by an ecology 
of knowledges, as we will see below (Santos et al., 2007: xx). These solutions should 
be constructed through a process of learning from the South, because only through 
the experiences of the social groups that suffered the consequences of the 
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epistemological exclusivism of modern science can we go beyond modern critical 
theory. The South is here seen as a metaphor of human suffering caused by capitalism 
and colonialism (Santos, 2010c: 227). This need to learn from the South comes from 
three important conclusions (Santos, 2002a: 238). First, social experience is much 
wider and more diverse than what Western scientific and philosophical tradition 
knows and considers important. Second, social richness is being wasted, which lends 
strength to the idea that there are no alternative knowledges. Lastly, to combat the 
waste of experience, to make visible alternative initiatives and movements and to 
confer credibility to them, it is necessary to propose a different model of rationality. 
Through the epistemologies of the South, Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
proposes “a plurality of collective projects, articulated in non-hierarchical forms by 
translation procedures, to replace the formulation of a general theory of social 
change” and “hybridization, fully aware of the power relations that intervene in the 
process, that is, looking into who or what gets hybridized, in what contexts and with 
what purposes” (Santos, 2010c: 228). If the faces of domination are multiple, 
resistances to it and their protagonists are also multiple, and therefore, rejecting 
single principles implies the impossibility of gathering all resistances and agencies 
under a great single theory (Santos, 1999: 202). As an epistemological, political and 
cultural orientation, he proposes that we detach ourselves from the imperial North in 
order to learn from the South. This learning only happens to the extent that the South 
is conceived of as resistance to the domination of the North, and what we should look 
for in the South is what has not been totally destroyed or disfigured by such 
domination (Santos, 2010c: 231). 
The author considers that all critical knowledge must start precisely with the 
critique of knowledge (Santos, 1999: 205). The epistemologies of the South are built 
from an epistemological tradition that has been marginalised and discredited by 
modernity, knowledge-as-emancipation. According to it, ignorance means 
colonialism, meaning thinking of the other as an object. Knowledge, on the contrary, 
is to acknowledge, in the sense of raising the other from the condition of object to the 
condition of subject. This knowledge-acknowledgement is what Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos calls solidarity (Santos, 1999: 205). Solidarity implies the recognition of the 
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other as equal and as an equal producer of knowledge, recognising and celebrating 
the particularities that contribute to each production of knowledge. The 
epistemologies of the South, by going from colonialism to solidarity, foster the 
development of a non-colonial order that bounds current experiences and 
expectations of future actions, and consequences, aiming at a decent life (Santos, 
2014: 156, 163). 
 
ABYSSAL GLOBAL LINES 
To describe the way modern Western thinking operates the author 
developed the metaphor of abyssal global lines (Santos, 2007, 2010b, 2010c, 2014). 
For him, modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking that creates a system of 
radical distinctions. This system has been developed because of the existence of 
abyssal lines that permanently erase any different reality that exists on the “other 
side of the line”, claiming modern forms of thinking and universal organisation 
(Santos, 2010b: 29). The main characteristic of abyssal thinking is the impossibility of 
the copresence of the two sides of the line. The visible distinctions that structure 
social reality on the modern side of the line are supported by the invisibility of the 
difference between this side of the line and the other side. Abyssal thinking is 
primarily the product of modern law and modern knowledge; they constitute the 
main global lines of modernity (Santos, 2007: 46). “In each of the two great domains – 
science and law – the divisions carried out by the global lines are abyssal to the extent 
that they effectively eliminate whatever realities are on the other side of the line” 
(Santos, 2014: 120). 
Here, the only concern is modern knowledge. Abyssal thinking attributed to 
modern science the universal capacity of distinguishing between what is true and 
what is false. This primacy left out two other groups of knowledge: philosophy and 
theology. The dispute between these three forms of reasoning - modern science, 
philosophy and theology - although widely acknowledged, happens on the same side 
of the line, the modern side. This explicit division is based on the invisibility of forms 
of knowledge that cannot be described as any of the above and they are: popular, lay, 
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plebeian, peasant or indigenous knowledges. It is impossible to apply the scientific 
distinction of true or false to them, therefore they disappear as valid knowledges. 
Furthermore, it is also impossible to integrate them in the realms of philosophy and 
theology, the other two forms of knowledge accepted by modernity. The other side of 
the line knows no real knowledge, only beliefs, opinions, and intuitive or subjective 
understandings (Santos, 2007: 47; 2014: 120). 
These experiences are wasted experiences, made invisible both as agents and 
agencies. Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues that the colonial zone was the initial 
social territory of these experiences (Santos, 2010a: 26). The colonial is the state of 
nature where civil society’s institutions have no space. Western modernity is 
characterised by the cohabitation of civil society and the state of nature. The colonial 
zone is the space of incomprehensible magical practices, whose weirdness attributed 
a condition of non-humanity to its agents. Civil society and the state of nature are 
separated by an abyssal line that refuses to recognise the latter, and therefore, the 
state of nature is declared non-existent (Santos, 2014: 121-122). This means “the 
present being created on the other side of the line is made invisible by its being 
reconceptualised as the irreversible past of this side of the line. The hegemonic 
contact converts simultaneity into noncontemporaneity” (Santos, 2007: 50). Modern 
humanity is not thinkable without modern sub-humanity. The denial of one part of 
humanity is fundamental for the declaration of the other part as universal. 
The logic of the abyssal global lines is still functioning at the present time; 
actually, these lines are moving and redefining themselves. The other side of the line 
is enlarging while the modern side is becoming increasingly smaller. This is 
happening because the logic of appropriation/violence is gaining ground over the 
logic of regulation/emancipation. In reality, besides contracting, 
regulation/emancipation is being appropriated by the logic of appropriation/violence 
(Santos, 2010b: 38). This shift is a consequence of the growing number of individuals 
subjected to the logic of appropriation/violence, typical of colonial spaces. The 
colonial is taken as a “metaphor for those who perceive their life experiences as 
taking place on the other side of the line and rebel against it”, independently of the 
site where these experiences occur (Santos, 2014: 125-126). 
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The reason that governs and nurtures abyssal global lines is considered a 
“lazy reason” by Boaventura de Sousa Santos. He characterises the hegemonic 
Western model of rationality as such after the work of Gottfried Leibniz12 (Santos, 
2004: 158). Indolent reason was the frame for all the great philosophical and 
epistemological debates of the last two centuries. The consolidation of the liberal 
state in Europe and North America, the industrial revolutions, the expansion of 
capitalism, colonialism and imperialism, constituted the social-political context in 
which lazy reason flourished. The indolence is manifested in the way it resists any 
change of routine and how it transforms hegemonic interests into true knowledge 
(Santos, 2002a: 240-241). In order to deconstruct this reason, thus enabling the 
occurrence of changes in the structure of knowledge, the author proposes a different 
model, that he calls cosmopolitan reason, the reason that grounds the epistemologies 
of the South (Santos, 2014: 164). 
Cosmopolitan reason is based on the recognition of three limitations of 
modern Western thinking (Santos, 2002a: 239). First, the understanding of the world 
far exceeds the Western understanding. Second, the understanding of the world and 
the way it creates and legitimises social power is closely related to modern 
conceptions of time and temporality. Finally, Western rationality narrows the present 
while it expands the future. The constriction of the present, caused by a particular 
conception of totality, transformed the present in a fugitive moment. Concurrently, 
the linear conception of time and the planning of history made it possible to expand 
the future indefinitely because the meaning and direction of history lie in progress 
and if progress is unbounded, the future is infinite. The larger the future the greater 
are its prospects when compared with the experiences of the present (Santos, 2002a: 
239; 2014: 181). The future is infinitely abundant and infinitely equal; it only exists to 
become past. A future like this does not need to be thought, here is the foundation of 
lazy reason (Santos, 2002a: 254). 
Subaltern cosmopolitanism “refers to the aspiration of oppressed groups to 
organise their resistance and consolidate political coalitions on the same scale as the 
                                                             
12 See Leinbniz, Gottfried (1985) [1710] Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, 
and the Origin of Evil. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 
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one used by the oppressors to victimise them, that is, the global scale” (Santos, 2014: 
135). It is manifested through the initiatives and movements that constitute counter-
hegemonic globalisation, that is, movements that struggle to transform unequal 
exchanges into exchanges of shared authority (Santos, 2002b: 29-30), fighting against 
economic, social, political and cultural exclusion created by neoliberal capitalism and 
globalisation. These groups strive for an egalitarian redistribution of social, material, 
political, cultural and symbolic resources in order to blur unequal power relations 
(Santos, 2010a: 42). Subaltern cosmopolitanism does not aim for uniformity or a 
general theory of social emancipation. It envisages equal weight for the principles of 
equality and recognition of differences. Therefore, it is the result of gathering 
together the different local, progressive struggles with the purpose of enhancing their 
emancipatory potential through translocal/local linkages (Santos, 2014: 135). Post-
abyssal thinking starts from the idea that the diversity of the world is inexhaustible 
and that it lacks an adequate epistemology, that is to say, the epistemological 
diversity of the world remains unconstructed (Santos, 2010a: 43). 
To break with lazy reason and affirm cosmopolitan rationality, the author 
proposes to expand the present and reveal the diversity of the world, while 
constricting the future. This is possible through the use of two different sociological 
tools: the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences. The great diversity 
exposed by the sociologies of absences and emergences cannot be explained by a 
universal general theory, because it would always favour some specific knowledge to 
the detriment of others. Therefore, he proposes a process of translation that is able to 
create mutual intelligibility between possible and available experiences (Santos, 
2002a: 239). 
 
SOCIOLOGY OF ABSENCES 
The sociology of absences has the general goal of deconstructing the idea of 
totality as a form of order. Totality has two main consequences (Santos, 2002a: 242). 
First, because nothing exists outside totality that is or deserves to be intelligible, this 
is seen as an exhaustive, exclusivist and complete reason, although it is just one of 
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many rational logics present in the world and is only dominant in modern Western 
societies. Second, total rationality cannot envisage the parts separated from the 
whole. Therefore, Western modernity has a very limited and selective understanding 
of the world, but also of itself. It is nevertheless interesting to see that this total 
rationality, originally from the West, is in fact derived from the East. Total rationality 
is the response of the West to its cultural and philosophical marginality relative to the 
East, which comprehends a wider diversity of worlds (earthly or not) and times 
(linear, cyclic…). Aware of its eccentricity with respect to its origin, Western 
rationality retrieved from it only what favours the expansion of capitalism and 
colonialism, as it was a limited project from the start. Therefore, the complexity of the 
world was reduced to the earthly world through the processes of secularisation and 
laicisation, and the diversity of times was reduced to linear time through the concepts 
of progress and revolution (Santos, 2014: 168-169). 
This condensed version of the world was made possible through a conception 
of the present time that reduces it to a fleeting moment between the past and the 
future This happens because, has shown above, Western modernity is organised 
around the shortfall of social experiences (lived in the present) compared with social 
expectations (the promises of the future). Therefore, contemporaneity forms an 
extremely small part of simultaneity, meaning that what is considered contemporary 
is a small sample of the existing reality (Santos, 2002a: 245; 2014: 138). There is a 
wide variety of social practices that remain invisible although happening at the same 
time as modern practices. This asymmetry actually hides a hierarchy: the superiority 
of those who establish the time that determines contemporaneity. Thus, a person who 
is ploughing the land today is considered a pre-modern peasant (Santos, 2014: 170). 
The critique of totality is an indispensable step to recover the experiences wasted by 
modern Western rationality. What is envisaged is to broaden the world through the 
broadening of the present, in order to identify and value its inexhaustible richness. To 
broaden our own rationality we must practice the sociology of absences. The goal of 
this research method is to transform impossible objects into possible ones and with 
them to transform absences into presences, and so analyse the fragments of social 
experience that were not socialised by total reason (Santos, 2002a: 245-246). 
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There are five ways to produce the non-existence that the sociology of 
absences envisages contesting. The first is the monoculture of knowledge and the 
rigour of knowledge. It consists of transforming modern science and high culture into 
the unique standards of truth and aesthetic quality. Non-existence is produced in the 
form of the ignorant (Santos, 2010b: 22). The second is the monoculture of linear time. 
It is the idea that history has only one recognised meaning and direction, which is 
progress, modernisation, development and globalisation. It declares to be backward 
everything that, according to the linear temporal norm, is asymmetrical in relation to 
what is considered advanced. This monoculture produces the non-contemporaneity 
of what is contemporary. Take as an example the encounter of an African peasant, 
considered pre-modern, with an official of the World Bank, a symbol of modernity. 
Ahead of time are the core countries of the International System, and, with them, the 
dominant knowledges, institutions and forms of sociability they produce. Non-
existence is, thus, generated in the form of backward (Santos, 2002a: 247; 2014: 173). 
The third is the monoculture of the naturalisation of differences. It consists of 
the distribution of populations according to different categories that naturalise 
hierarchies. This distribution results in relations of domination, derived from the 
natural inferiority of some populations. Relations of domination are the consequence 
and not the cause of that hierarchy; in fact, they can be considered a burden for those 
classified as superior. The white man’s civilising mission is one example (Santos, 
2010b: 23). A more recent example is the UN’s “responsibility to protect”, according 
to which the international ccommunity has the responsibility to intervene in cases 
where national governments cannot avoid massive violations of human rights. The 
fourth is the monoculture of logic of the dominant scale. In Western modernity, the 
dominant scale is the universal and the global. These realities are not sensitive to 
specific contexts and thus determine the irrelevance of other possible scales. In this 
case, non-existence is produced in the form of the local (Santos, 2002a: 248). Fifth 
and last is the monoculture of the capitalist logic of productivity. It considers that the 
only valid type of productivity is the capitalist one, with economic growth being an 
unquestionable rational goal. All other forms of productivity are deemed 
unproductive (Santos, 2014: 174). 
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The sociology of absences derives from two questions: first, how has Western 
modernity, based on such a selective understanding of reality, managed to achieve 
such importance, and second, how can that conception of totality and the rationality 
that supports it be confronted and overcome (Santos, 2014: 175). For each of the five 
non-existences Boaventura de Sousa Santos proposes an ecology. The purpose is to 
reveal the diversity and multiplicity of social practices and to give them credibility, in 
opposition to hegemonic and exclusivist practices (Santos, 2002a: 253). First, the 
ecology of knowledges. It is necessary to identify other knowledges and other 
standards of rigour that operate in a credible manner in social contexts, as well as 
practices declared as non-existent by total reason. The ecology of knowledges argues 
that there is no general ignorance or general knowledge. It is the incompleteness of 
all knowledges that facilitates epistemological dialogue and dispute between different 
knowledges (Santos, 2002a: 250). The concept of ecology of knowledges will be 
developed later in this chapter. 
Second, the ecology of temporalities. Societies consist of diverse temporalities 
and thus the disqualification, suppression and unintelligibility of many practices are 
related to the use of temporalities that are strange to Western capitalist modernity. 
The broadening of the present thus occurs by relativising the linear time (Santos, 
2002a: 251-252). The sociology of absences stems from the idea that different 
cultures produce different temporal rules. Therefore, “[i]t aims to free social practices 
from their status as residuum, devolving to them their own temporality and thus the 
possibility of autonomous development” (Santos, 2014: 177). Third, the ecology of 
recognition. The sociology of absences challenges coloniality, searching for a new 
interaction between the principles of equality and difference. It aims at mutual 
recognition, serving to deconstruct both difference and hierarchy (Santos, 2002a: 
252; 2014: 178). Fourth, the ecology of trans-scale. The local has to be conceptually 
de-globalised, which means retrieving from the local whatever is not the result of 
hegemonic globalisation. The goal is to find a focus of resistance against the unequal 
power relations generated by such globalisation, in order to construct a counter-
hegemonic globalisation (Santos, 2002a: 252; 2014: 179). Finally, the ecology of 
productivities. To retrieve and value alternative systems of production, such as 
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popular economic organisations, workers’ cooperatives, self-managed enterprises 
and a solidarity economy (Santos, 2014: 180). 
 
ECOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGES 
Active resistance is essential to confront abyssal thinking. Political resistance 
is therefore required and it should be anchored in epistemological resistance. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos believes that there is a need for a new post-abyssal 
thinking that he labels subaltern cosmopolitanism (Santos, 2010a: 41). It is intimately 
related to the activities and groups that constitute counter-hegemonic globalisation. 
The importance of this specific type of cosmopolitanism lies in its clear realisation of 
incompleteness, without, nevertheless, striving for completeness (Santos, 2007: 64). 
The plurality of non-Western understandings of reality show that the possibility of 
hybrid understandings that mix Western and non-Western thoughts, is almost infinite 
(Santos, 2010b: 48). Post-abyssal thinking implies thinking “from the perspective of 
the other side of the line, precisely because the other side of the line has been the 
realm of the unthinkable in western modernity” (Santos, 2007: 66). 
Post-abyssal thinking can be described as learning from the South through an 
epistemology of the South. It opposes the monoculture of modern science with the 
ecology of knowledges (Santos, 2007: 66). The ecology of knowledges recognises the 
plurality of heterogeneous knowledges, meaning the epistemologies of the South 
make an effort to rescue from oblivion alternative ways of thinking that were often 
classed by modern Western science as beliefs and superstitions without any scientific 
validity (Santos, 2010a: 44). The ecology of knowledges aims to grant equality of 
opportunity to different knowledges to show how they can contribute to another 
possible world, which, for the author, implies “a more just and democratic society, as 
well as one more balanced in its relations with nature”, that is, the possibility to 
achieve alternative ends (Santos, 2014: 190). 
Post-abyssal thinking is structured by three main ideas. First, the 
acknowledgement of radical copresence. Radical copresence attributes 
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contemporaneity to both sides of the line in equal terms by recognising various kinds 
of contemporaneity. This way, simultaneity is equated with contemporaneity. 
Rescuing the other side of the line from the past implies abandoning the linear 
conception of time (Santos, 2007: 66; 2014: 191). Second, post-abyssal thinking is 
based upon the ideas of epistemological multiplicity and plurality of knowledges, 
attributing validity to other forms of reasoning beyond scientific knowledge. Post-
abyssal thinking thus renounces any general epistemology (Santos, 2010a: 45). Third, 
counter-hegemonic globalisation is an important characteristic of post-abyssal 
thinking in that the ecology of knowledges acts as a counter-epistemology. The 
ecology of knowledges aims to guarantee epistemological consistency for pluralistic, 
propositive thinking (Santos, 2010b: 51-52). 
According to the ecology of knowledges, there is no unity of knowledge but 
neither is there unity of ignorance. “All ignorance is ignorant of a certain knowledge, 
and all knowledge is the overcoming of a particular ignorance” (Santos et al., 2007: 
xlvii). Ignorance is not always the starting point; it can be the point of arrival. A 
determinate learning process can cause the other knowledges to be forgotten. The 
utopia of inter-knowledge is to learn other knowledges without losing the knowledge 
we had before. The ecology of knowledges is guided by prudence, since the 
accumulation of different knowledges is followed by the constant raising of questions, 
for which it is only possible to find incomplete answers (Santos, 2014: 188, 206). 
The ecology of knowledges, recognising as it does the plurality of 
knowledges, cannot ignore modern science. Scientific knowledge has not been 
distributed in a socially equitable form, consequently the interventions it promotes in 
the real world usually serve the social groups with greatest access to such knowledge. 
This way, social injustice is actually fostered by cognitive injustice (Santos, 2010a: 
48). The ecology of knowledges does not exclude scientific knowledge but gives it a 
counter-hegemonic use. 
Such use consists, on one hand, in exploring the internal plurality of science, 
that is, alternative scientific practices that have been made visible by 
feminist and postcolonial epistemologies, and, on the other, in promoting 
the interaction and interdependence between scientific and non-scientific 
knowledges (Santos, 2007: 70). 
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Therefore, the knowledge proclaimed by the ecology of knowledges is 
knowledge-as-intervention-in-reality instead of knowledge-as-a-representation-of-
reality. Access to reality is permitted by concepts, theories, values and language, since 
we cannot have direct access to it. Notwithstanding, the knowledge constructed upon 
reality intervenes in it and has consequences. Thus, “knowledge is not representation, 
it is intervention” (Santos, 2014: 207). 
The credibility of a cognitive construction is measured by the type of 
intervention it promotes in the real world. The value of some of modern science’s 
technological interventions is not called into question, nevertheless possible 
interventions promoted by other forms of knowledge should be recognised (Santos, 
2014: 201). In each particular situation, the ecology of knowledges favours context 
dependent hierarchies, in light of the concrete results envisaged or accomplished by 
different forms of knowledge. These hierarchies determine the form of knowledge 
that guarantees a greater participation to the social groups related to such 
intervention (Santos, 2010a: 51) It is here that the urge for egalitarian and 
simultaneous copresence and for incompleteness lie, since it is not possible for a 
single type of knowledge to account for all the interventions in the world. Thus, all 
types of reasoning are incomplete in a variety of ways, because it is impossible to 
eradicate incompleteness (Santos, 2007: 71). Intersubjectivity is also important. 
Different knowledge practices happen at different time and space levels, therefore, in 
order to interconnect those different practices it is important to learn and act in a 
variety of scales (interscalarity) and to expand our temporal frame, acknowledging 
different rhythms (intertemporality) (Santos, 2010b: 54-55). 
Another important aspect of the ecology of knowledges is action-with-
clinamen. To Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the important distinction to make in the 
realm of social sciences is not the difference between structure and agency, but the 
distinction between conformist action and action-with-clinamen. Conformist action is 
routinely, reproductively and repetitive action, without capacity of questioning social 
reality. While, clinamen represents a deviation from reality as we know it, it has a 
transformative character (Santos, 2010a: 54-55). This specific type of action is not 
concerned with a dramatic break with Western reality, as revolutionary action is, but 
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instead it performs a slight deviation from that reality whose “cumulative effects 
render possible the complex and creative combinations among atoms, hence also 
among living beings and social groups” (Santos, 2007: 77). The ecology of knowledges 
acts to identify the circumstances that take full advantage of the probability of the 
occurrence of action-with-clinamen and to define the various possibilities within 
which the deviation can occur. Clinamen represents an important input to post-
abyssal thinking thanks to its capacity to pass through abyssal global lines (Santos, 
2010b: 60). 
 
SOCIOLOGY OF EMERGENCES 
The sociology of absences amplifies the present, adding to the already 
existing reality what was turned into non-existent by modern Western rationality. 
Still, the present is also amplified by the sociology of emergences, adding to this new 
reality the future possibilities and expectations it contains. Whilst the sociology of 
absences operates in the field of social experiences, the sociology of emergences 
operates in the field of social expectations (Santos, 2002a: 256-257). It consists of 
replacing the emptiness of the future according to linear time with a future of plural 
and concrete possibilities that are at the same time utopian and realistic (Santos, 
2010b: 24). The future is thereby contracted, becoming scarce and consequently an 
object of care (Santos, 2014: 182). The future is no longer the place of high, probably 
never realised, expectations; instead, expectations start to be based on tangible 
possibilities and capacities (Santos, 2002a: 257). Contracting the future consists of 
narrowing the gap between the future of societies and the future of individuals, since 
the second is much shorter than the first. The future’s limited character and its 
dependency on the management and caring of individuals render it a factor of 
enlargement of the present (Santos, 2002a: 254). 
The sociology of emergences entails “the symbolic amplification of signs, 
clues, and latent tendencies that, however inchoate and fragmented, do point to new 
constellations of meaning as regards both the understanding and the transformation 
of the world” (Santos, 2007: 64). Its central concept is the “Not Yet”, proposed by 
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Ernst Bloch (1995). “The Not-Yet characterizes the tendency in material process, of 
the origin which is processing itself out, tending towards the manifestation of its 
content” (Bloch, 1995: 307). Bloch developed this idea because he considered that the 
concept of possible was largely ignored by Western modernity, despite its importance 
in revealing the endless wealth in the world (Santos, 2014: 182). 
The Not Yet inscribes an uncertain possibility in the present. A present 
possibility can, in the future, either fulfil the expectations as it can reach frustration. 
Thus, transformation is accompanied by both chance and danger. It is the uncertainty 
connected to the possibility of transformation that, for Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
acts to enlarge the present while contracting the future. Because the horizon of 
possibilities is limited, it is important not to waste the prospects of change offered by 
the present. Therefore, to take full advantage of those prospects requires precaution 
and great attention to protect them and maximise the probability of hope in relation 
to the probability of frustration (Santos, 2002a: 255; 2010b: 26). This is why, for the 
author, the future according to linear time that recognises only one direction must be 
replaced by a future where multiple paths are conceivable. “Caring for the future is 
imperative because it is impossible to armour hope against frustration, the advent 
against nihilism, redemption against disaster (…)” (Santos, 2014: 184). 
The sociology of emergences acts either upon the possibilities (potentiality) 
as upon the capacities (potency). Not Yet has a meaning (as possibility) but not a 
direction (Santos, 2002a: 255). Thus, the sociology of emergences conceives the 
discrepancy between experiences and expectations without resorting to the idea of 
progress. It aims at a balanced relation between the two, radicalising expectations 
built on real possibilities and capacities, here and now (Santos, 2014: 185). As 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos warns us, these are the preconditions to social 
emancipation. 
The expectations legitimated by the sociology of emergences are both 
contextual, because gauged by concrete possibilities, and radical, because, in 
the ambit of those possibilities and capacities, they claim a strong fulfilment 
that protects them, though never completely, from frustration and 
perversion. In such expectations resides the reinvention of social 
emancipation, or rather emancipations (Santos, 2014: 185). 
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The  sociology of absences and the sociology emergences each helps, in its 
own way, to slow down the present, providing it a with a denser and more 
substantive content than the fleeting moment between the past and the future that 
modern rationality has reserved for it (Santos, 2002a: 258). The importance of both 
sociologies is that they render contemporary realities that have until now been 
invisible, enlarging the understanding of the present and also revealing the multitude 
of directions the future can take. Both sociologies are grounded on a subjective 
dimension. The sociology of absences derives from non-conformism and an insurgent 
cosmopolitan consciousness regarding the waste of experiences, while the sociology 
of emergences derives from non-conformism and an anticipatory consciousness 
regarding a desire whose fulfilment is within the bounds of possibilities (Santos, 
2014: 184). The knowledge produced by both sociologies is an argumentative 
knowledge that aims at persuading rather than demonstrating and that instead of 
aiming to be rational, wants to be reasonable, with its evolution being based on the 
credible identification of emergent knowledges and practices (Santos, 2002a: 258). 
The multiplication and diversification of experiences available and possible 
raises two problems: the problem of extreme fragmentation and atomisation of 
reality and the problem of the impossibility of giving sense to social transformation. 
From the perspective of cosmopolitan reason, the world is composed of multiple 
totalities, all necessarily partial and incomplete, and thus, the task is not to identify 
new totalities or adopt other meanings for social transformation, it is rather to 
propose new ways of thinking those totalities and conceiving those meanings (Santos, 
2002a: 261). That said, it is unreasonable to try to capture all this multiplicity in one 
grand theory; actually, this would be contrary to the sociological work just proposed, 
since a general theory always proposes the monoculture of a given totality and the 
homogeneity of its parts. In order to make sense of the findings of the sociology of 
absences and the sociology of emergences, Boaventura de Sousa Santos proposes the 
work of translation, a procedure that creates reciprocal intelligibility between the 
experiences of the world, both those available and those possible (Santos, 2002a: 
262). 
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WORK OF TRANSLATION 
The alternative to a general theory is the work of translation. Intercultural 
translation 
Consists of searching for isomorphic concerns and underlying assumptions 
among cultures, identifying differences and similarities, and devolving, 
whenever appropriate, new hybrid forms of cultural understanding and 
intercommunication that may be useful in favouring interactions and 
strengthening alliances among social movements fighting, in different 
cultural contexts, against capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy and for 
social justice, human dignity, or human decency (Santos, 2014: 212). 
The work of translation facilitates reciprocal intelligibility among culturally 
diverse social experiences, undermining the idea of original and pure cultures and 
emphasising the idea of cultural interaction (Santos, 2014: 217). It thus opposes the 
universalism lying at the centre of modern Western theories and the idea of 
incommensurability between cultures. The idea of impossible understanding 
between cultures and the idea of universality are closely related since they represent 
the relationships of destruction and assimilation between Western-cultures and non-
modern cultures. These relationships disregard non-Western cultures as relevant 
alternatives, represented as they are by military conquest, ideological indoctrination 
or linguistic repression, among others (Santos, 2014: 212). 
The work of translation seeks to capture two aspects: the hegemonic relation 
between different social experiences, revealing the remains of colonial heritage, and 
what is beyond that relation, recovering historical-cultural possibilities interrupted 
by colonial relations. It is in this double movement that social experiences become 
able to be submitted to relations of reciprocal intelligibility (Santos, 2002a: 262). The 
work of translation focuses on both knowledges and practices, but also on their 
agents. Intercultural translation can have two types of dialogue, between Western 
and non-Western ideas and practices, and between different non-Western 
conceptions and practices. This work aims to learn from the anti-imperial South, 
taken as a symbol for the “global, systemic, and unjust human suffering caused by 
capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy and for the resistance against the causes of 
such suffering” (Santos, 2014: 222-223). 
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Translation between knowledges, concepts, and worldviews takes the form 
of “diatopical hermeneutics”. The use of this concept is inspired by the work of 
Raymond Panikkar13. It consists of the interpretation work needed between two 
cultures to identify similar concerns and the different responses thereby provided 
(Santos, 2014: 219). This means that all cultures are incomplete and can thus be 
enriched by dialogue and confrontation with other cultures. Therefore, diatopical 
hermeneutics does not strive for completeness; actually, it wants to raise awareness 
to mutual incompleteness by facilitating dialogue between different cultural 
commonplaces, with the goal of arriving at reciprocal understanding (Santos, 2014: 
219-220). Diatopical hermeneutics conceives universalism as a Western particularity, 
relating the critique of universalism to the rejection of a general theory. It instead 
presupposes a negative universalism, the idea of the impossibility of cultural 
completeness (Santos, 2002a: 264). 
The sociology of absences and emergences, together with the work of 
translation, contributes to the development of an alternative to the indolent reason, 
in the form of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls cosmopolitan reason. This 
alternative is based on the idea that global social justice is not possible without global 
cognitive justice (Santos, 2002a: 273). The work of translation represents, in addition 
to intercultural dialogue, inter-political translation, a “procedure that promotes the 
intermovement politics at the source of counter-hegemonic globalisation” (Santos, 
2014: 213). The work of translation assumes great importance when promoting the 
interaction of different non-hegemonic knowledges and practices since it contributes 
to their reciprocal intelligibility and consequently to the possibility of aggregation, 
thereby facilitating the construction of counter-hegemony (Santos, 2002a: 265). 
Intercultural translation is, therefore, a political project which intends to evince 
shared cultural meanings in order to turn demands into objectives worth fighting for. 
Political interconnection allows mutual intelligibility among forms of organisation 
and objectives of action (Santos, 2014: 213, 222). 
The goal of the work of translation is to create constellations of knowledges 
and practices strong enough to provide credible alternatives to neoliberal 
                                                             
13 Panikkar, Raymond (1979) Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics. New York: Paulist. 
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globalisation, which constitutes another step of global capitalism on the path to 
subject the inexhaustible totality of the world to mercantilist logic (Santos, 2002a: 
274). The purpose of the work of translation is to overcome the natural 
fragmentation of the wide diversity of social knowledges and experiences in the 
world, revealed by the sociologies mentioned above, with the goal of building a solid, 
consistent and competent anti-imperial South (Santos, 2014: 224). This establishes 
the conditions for the development of specific social emancipations of specific social 
groups, grounded on transformative practices that reinvent the present with a view 
to having a better future (Santos, 2014: 234). 
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4TH CHAPTER | LEARNING FROM AND WITH THE SOUTH: AN APPROACH TO 
PEACEBUILDING 
Peacebuilding is both a concept and a practice. As a concept, it is an idea 
developed with the purpose of constructing peace in countries affected by real or 
imminent conflict. The adjective “liberal” that generally precedes peacebuilding stems 
from its ideological content. Liberal peacebuilding aims at constructing a liberal 
peace. Although liberal peacebuilding has acquired a status of hegemony within the 
international community, it is not the only conception of peacebuilding. The 
peacebuilding concept varies according to the sort of peace it wishes to build. 
Newman, for example, distinguishes three different types of peacebuilding: 
transformatory peacebuilding, realist peacebuilding and liberal peacebuilding (2009: 
47-50), and many others can exist. But besides being an idea, peacebuilding is also a 
practice and an intervention mechanism designed to restore peace in post-conflict 
countries. This mechanism has been most widely developed by the United Nations, as 
shown in the first chapter, but it is also employed by regional organisations such as 
the European Union and the African Union. 
The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, to construct a critique of liberal 
peace based on Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ abyssal lines metaphor, to show the 
association of liberal peace with the reasoning that structures modern Western 
thinking. Second, to develop a conceptual proposal that constitutes an advance for 
peace studies through the incorporation of the conceptual framework of the 
epistemologies of the South, thus developing the concept of post-abyssal 
peacebuilding. The third purpose is to relate post-abyssal peacebuilding to the UN’s 
actions, raising the hypothesis of integrating a different kind of peacebuilding and a 
different idea of peace into the UN framework. This is a purely exploratory chapter. 
The ideas presented are merely a draft of work that requires further research. The 
purpose is to open a debate on, first, the possibility of developing a post-abyssal 
model of peacebuilding, inspired by the epistemologies of the South, and, second, the 
possibility of integrating that model into that UN’s peace structure. 
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LIBERAL PEACE: ANOTHER ABYSSAL LINE 
Like modern Western thinking, liberal peace acts in an abyssal manner in the 
sense that it effectively eliminates whatever realities are on the other side of the line. 
Liberal peace does not recognise the existence of other peace models that do not 
conform to liberal values. Therefore, liberal peace contributes to the negation of the 
epistemological diversity of the world by reinforcing the foundations where modern 
thinking lays its universal and totalitarian character. Liberal peace constitutes an 
abyssal line that distinguishes between the right form of peace, which is achievable 
through liberal market democracies, and disposable experiences of peace rooted in 
popular, lay, peasant or endogenous knowledges and made invisible both as agencies 
and agents. 
According to Santos and Meneses (2010: 9-10) all valid knowledges are 
contextual, either in terms of political or cultural differences. Therefore, even the 
dominant epistemology, which is modern Western thinking, is contextual and is 
based on a dual difference: the cultural difference of the Western Christian modern 
world and the political difference of colonialism and capitalism. The transformation 
of this contextual knowledge into universal knowledge is the result of an 
epistemological intervention that was only possible through the force of the political, 
economic and military intervention of modern colonialism and capitalism and its 
imposition on non-Western peoples and cultures. Hegemonic principles and practices 
have thus been established through the construction of abyssal lines that negate the 
existence of the plurality of the world (Santos, 2014: 124). Likewise, liberal peace 
became hegemonic through the maintenance and perpetuation of the cultural and 
political relationships that gave primacy to modern Western thinking: colonialism 
and capitalism. 
The relationships between global North and the global South fostered by 
peacebuilding are based on a deeply unequal power status and create high levels of 
dependency between international actors and local actors (at both a state and civil 
society level). This dependency is manifested in political and economic terms, and 
results in a big loss of autonomy for local actors, who are expected to follow the 
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dictates of liberal peace. The colonial aspect of these relationships is manifested by 
the imposition of a particular model of governance, liberal democracy, typical of 
Western countries but not widely developed in the global South. Capitalist 
relationships are manifested through the imposition of the free market, privatisations 
and an economy based on the extraction of natural resources. 
Like modern Western thinking, liberal peace is rooted in the discrepancy 
between social experiences and social expectations. Intervention by international 
actors in post-conflict spaces creates great expectations of the future possibilities of 
peace, which are often disappointed with the course of peacebuilding missions. As 
seen in the second chapter, peacebuilding missions rarely accomplish their initial 
goals. Nevertheless, the difference between present experiences and future 
expectations, in this case the expectation of lasting peace, is a fundamental 
characteristic of the reasoning that structures liberal peace. The idea of progress is 
rooted in this divergence. The path to peace is a one-way road from chaos and 
destruction to the stability conferred by representative democracy, the free market 
and the rule of law. 
This fixed model of progress, related to the belief that a specific model of 
governance will bring peace and stability to post-conflict countries, results in highly 
planned, repetitive and inflexible peace missions designed to foster peace through 
technocratic solutions alone. The consequence is, once more, that more creative 
locally-based solutions that are rooted in epistemologies different from modern 
Western thinking are disregarded. The rigid character of peace missions is evidence 
of how modern Western thinking works. As seen above, modern Western thinking 
reduces the complexity of reality in order to control it; therefore, reality is defined in 
the form of laws that describe regular phenomena with the goal of predicting their 
future behaviour (Santos, 1992: 17; 1995: 13). The same is valid for liberal peace and 
peacebuilding; a general law of peace is defined and equally applied to all post-
conflict scenarios. Like modern knowledge, liberal peace has a utilitarian and 
functional character and produces the transformation of reality based on a static and 
limited conception of progress. 
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The supremacy of the pillar of regulation over the pillar of emancipation is, as 
explained before, clearly present in liberal peace. Modern Western thinking is 
structured along a progressive line that goes from ignorance to knowledge. Following 
this logic, the pillar of social regulation that is prevalent in modern thinking conceives 
the diversity of modes of knowing and intervention in the world as symptoms of 
chaos, which is at the extreme point of ignorance. On the other hand, knowledge is 
conceived as order, and in this case order means the state, the market and the 
community (Santos, 2014: 139). The same rational logic can be found in liberal peace. 
Chaos, the post-conflict failed state turmoil, is the initial position of a progressive 
process that, through international help, will end in a state of order and stability, 
represented by the construction of a solid state founded on democratic principles and 
the rule of law, which facilitates the establishment of the free market and contributes 
to the flourishing of a strong civil society. Order is thus achieved when post-conflict 
states resemble modern Western states. 
But, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007: 54-55) warns, the logic of 
regulation/emancipation is being corrupted by the logic of appropriation/violence. 
Liberal peace is also affected by this phenomenon. Although the discourse of liberal 
peace develops around the principles of the state and the market, the ways these 
principles are enforced resemble the logic that has always ruled the colonial 
relationship between the global North and the global South, the logic of 
appropriation/violence. Peacebuilding intervention, conditionality and even the 
disguised discourse of partnership are all coercive tools whose purpose is to impose 
liberal peace on post-conflict states. This shows the deeply unequal power relations 
that still operate between the global North and the global South, whereby the 
stronger power has an almost absolute control over the lives of the weaker party. 
What becomes evident is that Western modernity can only be spread if it contradicts 
its founding principles (Santos, 2014: 127). Liberal peace, based on the idea of 
representative democracy and engagement with civil society, is actually implemented 
through mechanisms of force that completely disrespect local concerns and different 
conceptions of peace. 
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POST-ABYSSAL PEACEBUILDING 
Having in mind Newman’s distinctions of peacebuilding (Newman, 2009: 47-
50), the concept of peacebuilding based on the epistemologies of the South could be 
classified as transformatory. That is, concerned with a solid resolution of conflict that 
addresses the root causes of violence, based on the premise that peace requires 
bottom-up community initiatives that give free expression to local desires and 
anxieties. According to the author, this form of peacebuilding comes close to 
advocating emancipation as the primary goal of peacebuilding as it rejects universal 
approaches to the resolution of conflicts. Transformatory peacebuilding pays greater 
attention to context and community needs, respecting different processes relating to 
politics, economics, justice and governance, other than the liberal model (Newman, 
2009: 47). 
Following this transformatory logic, a peacebuilding model based on the 
epistemologies of the South would be grounded on the idea of solidarity. In this 
particular case, solidarity entails the recognition by the International Community of 
the other affected by conflict as an equal subject and as equally capable of producing 
knowledge in order to work on constructions of peace that take advantage of the 
opportunities to live well (Santos, 1999, 2014). Solidarity should be transnational and 
work both between the global North and the global South, as well as within the global 
South; entailing coexistence, dialogue and interaction between different forms of 
knowledge. As it was clear in the previous chapter, global cognitive justice is a 
necessary premise for social justice, and I consider it is also necessary for peace. 
What is being sought is a post-abyssal peace, a peace that aims at buen vivir 
(good living) (Santos, 2014). This is an emancipatory project, sensitive to specific 
contexts, and thus does not aim to form a great theory of peace. A post-abyssal 
peacebuilding project demands sociological imagination of two kinds: epistemological 
imagination and democratic imagination. The first, helps with recognising “different 
knowledges, perspectives and scales of identification and relevance, and analysis and 
evaluation of practices”; the second, “allows the recognition of different practices and 
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social agents” (Santos, 2014: 181). Both have a deconstructive as well as a 
reconstructive dimension. 
What is advocated is that, in making peace, there should be a main goal that 
must be followed, and that is social emancipation (or emancipations); nevertheless, 
no specific peace model is advanced since it is considered that there is no right or 
wrong in building peace as there are no right or wrong forms of political, social and 
economic organisation. Instead, the goal of post-abyssal peacebuilding would be to 
relate different social practices and knowledges in mutual constructive relations. The 
objective of post-abyssal peacebuilding would be to provide the tools for dialogue 
between social actors that have experienced conflict, but also between those that 
have not, in order to share both the experiences of violence and experience of peace, 
with a view to reaching common emancipatory concepts of peace. This process, both 
internal and international, aims at emancipating not only those who have been 
affected by direct violence and open conflict, but also those who, for some reason, are 
victims of colonial and capitalist violence in formally peaceful societies. 
I want to relate, here, the concept of emancipation to the importance of 
dreams. For me, emancipation is based on the right of societies to construct and 
pursue their most fundamental dreams. According to Gaston Bachelard,  
It is not with numbers, it is not with the course of history that we can 
overcome the millennial darkness. No, it is necessary to dream - dream in 
the awareness that life is a dream, that what we have dreamed beyond what 
we have lived is true, it is alive, it is here, present in all its genuineness 
before our eyes14 (1970: 19). 
Drawing on Bachelard’s work, Rubem Alves draws attention to the concept of 
fundamental dreams, which have a general character, living on the minds of everyone, 
and so creating a sense of togetherness (Alves, 2002: 36-37). In my view, every 
human being on earth has the right to explore the possibilities the world has to offer. 
This is not synonymous with searching for progress or development in Western 
terms, on the contrary, emancipation means reclaiming from exclusion the large 
                                                             
14 Originally in French: “[c]e n’est pas avec des chiffres, ce n’est pas en courant sur la ligne de l’histoire 
qu’on peut percer les ténèbres des millénaires. Non, il faut beaucoup rêver – rêver en prégnant 
conscience que la vie est un rêve, que ce qu’on rêve au-delà de ce qu’on a vécu est vrai, est vivant, est là, 
présent en toute vérité devant nos yeux.” 
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majority of the world currently under colonial and capitalist oppression, giving them 
the possibility to construct their own dreams. The change that post-abyssal 
peacebuilding envisages is, therefore, to be seen in the present. Since it is in the 
present time that these possibilities can be tried and, eventually, accomplished, thus 
fulfilling fundamental dreams. Peace has to be made from concrete possible realities 
instead of never-accomplished expectations. That is why, in post-abyssal 
peacebuilding, the present becomes more significant than the future. 
Sociology of Absences 
Post-abyssal peace rejects any formulation of a general or totalising peace. In 
contrast with liberal peace, it is not a fixed model of what are the right conditions to 
achieve stability. On the contrary, it wants to explore different conceptions and 
possibilities of making peace and does not defend a final end result; actually it 
conceives the likelihood of existing many peaces. Therefore, post-abyssal 
peacebuilding practices the sociology of absences which, as described above, aims to 
explain that what does not exist is in fact actively transformed into non-existent, that 
is, into non-credible alternatives (Santos, 2002a: 246). Relating to peace, it means 
that liberal peace, widely affirmed as the right model to achieve lasting and 
sustainable peace, is in fact one of many other ways of practising peace and that other 
ways must be explored. 
Post-abyssal peacebuilding, thus, confronts the five modes of production of 
non-existence described by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010b: 22-24)15: 
monoculture of knowledge and the rigour of knowledge, monoculture of linear time, 
monoculture of the naturalisation of differences, monoculture of logic of the 
dominant scale and lastly, monoculture of the capitalist logic of productivity. Hence, 
post-abyssal peacebuilding addresses each of the ecologies the author developed to 
challenge the five monocultures. The ecology of knowledges, as just said, aims to 
reveal other forms of peace that can operate credibly in post-conflict contexts, 
rejecting general and universal conceptions. The ecology of temporalities aims to 
show that different forms of peace can coexist at the same time, as they are 
                                                             
15 The five modes of production of non-existence are dealt with more detail in the third chapter. 
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contemporary. It deconstructs the idea of a standard linear progression of time 
associated with a form of peace, the liberal model, ahead of all the others. Divergent 
conceptions of peace are no longer regarded as backward. It intends to devolve to 
each social practice its own temporality and thus allow them to develop 
autonomously (Santos, 2002a: 251). 
The ecology of recognition implies embracing difference and rejecting the 
social hierarchies that helped to create the “moral obligation” of intervention of the 
global North in the global South in order to show it the way to civilisational progress 
and development. “By enlarging the reciprocity circle – the circle of equal differences 
– the ecology of recognition creates a new exigency of reciprocal intelligibility” 
(Santos, 2014: 178). The ecology of trans-scale aims at identifying local 
manifestations of resistance against the unequal power relations that are produced or 
favoured by liberal peace. Finally, the ecology of productivities confronts the 
paradigm of capitalist productivity endorsed by the liberal peace. It sets out to give 
visibility to initiatives that “share a comprehensive conception of ‘economy’ in which 
they include such objectives as democratic participation; environmental 
sustainability; social, sexual, racial, ethnic, and cultural equity; and transnational 
solidarity” (Santos, 2014: 181). These initiatives include movements of peasants and 
indigenous people fighting for land and land ownership, urban movements fighting 
for housing, movements against development mega-projects and popular economic 
movements, among others. 
Sociology of Emergences 
Post-abyssal peacebuilding also practices the sociology of emergences, by 
replacing the idea of a progressive process to obtain peace, based on mainly technical 
procedures, with the idea of care. According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the 
sociology of emergences consists of replacing the emptiness of the future according to 
linear time with a future of plural and concrete possibilities, simultaneously utopian 
and realist, which are constructed in the present by means of activities of care 
(2010b: 24). “At every moment, there is a limited horizon of possibilities, and that is 
why it is important not to waste the unique opportunity of a specific change offered 
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by the present” (Santos, 2014: 183). The sociology of emergences alerts us to the 
possibility of different peaces but also to their fragility, which is why, in order to 
maintain hope instead of reaching frustration, it is important to deal with those 
peaces cautiously. Cultivating these different forms of peace makes room for the 
development of social emancipations. Emancipations, once again, are not seen as a 
final stage of development, what the sociology of emergences shows is that new 
possibilities of peace are constantly emerging and thus need to be carefully observed. 
Work of Translation 
In order to construct a more solid peace, post-abyssal peacebuilding should 
implement a work of translation directed at the sharing of experiences, knowledges 
and practices of peace. The work of translation gives coherence to the results of the 
sociologies of absences and emergences while, at the same time, deconstructing the 
universalism that lies at the heart of liberal peacebuilding. “Intercultural translation 
is a tool to minimize the obstacles to political articulation among different social 
groups and movements fighting across the globe for social justice and human dignity 
when said obstacles are due to cultural difference and reciprocal unintelligibility” 
(Santos, 2014: 213). As mentioned above, at the centre of post-abyssal peacebuilding 
is the need for dialogue between different experiences of war and peace, both 
between global North and global South actors, and also within the global South. 
In order to unveil the logics of conflict and violence that structured war-torn 
societies it is necessary to work with the people and the social groups they represent. 
To achieve a durable and solid peace it is important to step down from the scale of the 
state and high politics and search for answers in the lower layers of society. What is 
envisaged is a process of peace construction that engages large sectors of society, 
thus breaking with the logics of power that have pervaded the political landscape of 
those countries during conflict and that, premised by the current peacebuilding 
model, have tended to prevail in the post-conflict society. This requires a broader 
understanding of the actors involved in the conflict. It is not only the political leaders 
of the different factions and the men and women who fought that constitute the 
conflict masses; all the people in war-torn countries are affected and involved in 
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conflict, and consequently, all the population has to be involved in the process of 
peace. For that reason, they should participate in processes of translation in order to 
explain their conceptions of peace and so avoid the hegemonic imposition of liberal 
peace. 
This participatory process creates the possibility of a bottom-up political 
delineation of the peace each society wishes to achieve in the aftermath of war, in a 
rejection of the idea of a general peace formulated and developed by external actors. 
It is through the dialogue proposed that a transformative process of war into peace 
can emerge and work to change the present, and create conditions for concrete social 
emancipations of real social groups, in order to construct a better near future (Santos, 
2014: 234). Post-abyssal peacebuilding becomes even more relevant when we note 
that the majority of conflicts that liberal peacebuilding sought to stop happened, so 
far, on the other side of the line, and were most typically from the global South and 
from spaces that were subject to some form of imperial rule or domination, whether 
colonial or not. Post-abyssal peace, therefore, contributes to overcoming those forms 
of domination through the larger transformation of promoting global cognitive justice 
in order to obtain global social justice. The acknowledgment and identification of 
different conceptions of peace involves the identification of different models of social, 
political and economic organisation and thus serves to deconstruct the domination 
patterns fostered by the colonial and capitalist model. 
Post-abyssal peacebuilding constitutes a conceptual framework that I 
consider extremely valid to address post-conflict environments. International 
relations, and peace studies in particular, would benefit from a conceptualisation of 
peace based on the epistemologies of the South. The sociology of absences helps us to 
understand the existing reality on the ground as it serves to confront the liberal peace 
with endogenous conceptions of peace. The sociology of emergences warns about the 
importance of preserving those peaces revealed by the sociology of absences, which 
can easily be destroyed by interaction with international actors. Finally, the work of 
translation helps to establish a dialogue between multiple experiences of peace that 
can learn from each other and together create spaces of common resistance to the 
imposition of liberal peace and associated exploitative relationships. 
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The post-abyssal peacebuilding model, based on the conceptual framework 
of the epistemologies of the South, supplements the work so far developed by hybrid 
peace theories. These investigations recognise that local actors are able to resist 
international intervention and produce hybrid concepts of peace, therefore 
possessing agency. With the epistemologies of the South it is possible to reinforce this 
work by revealing, defining and mapping of the epistemologies that underlie and 
inspire local agency. Here lies the relevance of bringing Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ 
concepts to peace studies. It makes it possible to further the knowledge about the 
local that has been produced so far, to establish more precisely who the local is and 
what it thinks. The great contribution of the epistemologies of the South is their 
search for hybrid understandings of peace through the work of translation. 
Nevertheless, those hybrid understandings have an emancipatory character, since 
they are the product of a dialogue between equally valid knowledges and confront the 
hegemonic character of the hybrid peaces that result from the current interaction 
between the international and the local, which is still based on profoundly unequal 
relations of power. 
 
EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE SOUTH AND THE UN 
Now that the post-abyssal peacebuilding model has been defined, inspired by 
the epistemologies of the South proposed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, there arises 
the question of the possibility of integrating this model into the UN framework for 
peace, the UN being largest international organisation concerned with peacebuilding 
activities. The pursuit of post-abyssal peacebuilding implies participating in a process 
of translation aimed at identifying and starting a dialogue between different peaces. 
Therefore, the goal of this last section is to find out if the UN could be one of the 
actors concerned with this translation work. In my view, the translation process is a 
valuable way to deal with the local and its epistemologies. It serves to establish and 
value local formulations of peace by recognising agency in local actors and, more 
importantly, by acknowledging them as valid producers of knowledge with the 
capacity to define their own standards of peace. 
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To practise the work of translation entails being ready to learn new forms of 
peace and implies recognising that liberal peace is not the only model of peace, thus 
negating its universality. The outcome of this process is also hybridity, but the hybrid 
concepts of peace that might arise are the result of a process of dialogue that allows 
for mutual intelligibility among culturally diverse social experiences, instead of the 
process of violence that international intervention in post-conflict countries currently 
represents, and the hybrid peace theories expose. The goal, therefore, is to see if the 
UN would be open to participating in this translation process, while recognising and 
explaining the numerous difficulties and obstacles that the integration of post-abyssal 
peacebuilding into the UN framework would represent and also warning about the 
risks of cooptation and subversion that this would represent for the epistemologies of 
the South project. 
It would not be an easy task. The peace model envisaged by the UN proposes 
exactly what the epistemologies of the South want to deconstruct: a universalist 
model based on relations of political and economic dominance that aims to transform 
societies according to the development model followed by the West. Nonetheless, the 
goal is not to propose a complete transformation of the UN’s system, values and form 
of action. What I want to do is to explore the possibility of integrating into the UN 
some of the proposals reflected in the post-abyssal peacebuilding paradigm set out 
above, though I am quite aware that this is in itself problematic. This exercise raises 
some ethical, and even moral questions, since it starts from a critical perspective and 
not from a problem-solving approach. However, I am not upholding the importance of 
maintaining the UN peacebuilding model, although improving it, or recognising the 
validity of the liberal approach to peace. What is envisaged is to understand if, despite 
the great risk of cooptation, the epistemologies of the South project can be advanced 
by a structure like the UN, by penetrating the international policy-making arena and 
influencing it. 
The epistemologies of the South are underpinned by three main ideas: learn 
that there is a South, learn to go South and learn from and with the South (Santos, 
1995: 508). The UN has already achieved the first two: it knows very well there is a 
South and how to get there. Yet, this awareness is not based on emancipatory 
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practices; on the contrary, the UN has been the face of the exclusionist colonial and 
capitalist model. The awareness of the South derives from the desire to maintain the 
relationships of domination that have prevailed between the global North and the 
global South since the 15th century and from the need to intervene in the global South 
when this is deemed to be in the interest of the global North. The first obstacle to the 
participation of the UN in the process of translation is its identification with modern 
Western thinking, which impedes the acknowledgment that the liberal peace is not 
the only valid peace in the world. Recognising the incompleteness of all forms of 
knowledge is a basic premise for subscribing to a process of translation, and 
therefore the UN has to acknowledge the limited character of liberal peace if it wants 
to participate in a translation process. 
The United Nations is a modern institution; this is clear in its structure but 
also in the manner in which its bodies and agencies operate. It follows the logic of 
knowledge-as-regulation that became dominant in modern Western thinking since it 
is mainly based on the principles of the state and the market (Santos, 2010a: 24). 
Although called a union of nations, from the very first the UN has been an association 
of states, and more, an association where the most powerful states form a club with 
the power to decide and act, almost without restraint, on important issues that affect 
all the members of the organisation. The UN, for example, hosts two of the most 
important and powerful promoters of capitalism worldwide, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which, besides attaching their aid to the 
liberalisation of economies, also make aid conditional on the development of modern 
liberal states. To sum up, the UN serves to promote capitalist and colonial forms of 
domination; liberal peacebuilding is just one of many examples of the structures 
created to maintain the modern system as it is. 
This raises the second major obstacle to advocating the participation of the 
UN in the translation process. The UN is a highly hierarchical structure with fixed 
power relations that nurture the supremacy of the permanent members of the 
Security Council, over the international system. These states have almost unlimited 
powers when dealing with questions of war and peace, with these subjects being 
subordinated to their political will. If the work of translation is to be properly 
-92- 
 
developed there is no place whatsoever for unequal power relations, since only 
relations of shared authority allow reciprocity between the groups participating in 
the translation work (Santos, 2014: 214). A dialogue developed with such an 
organisation is obviously of an unequal character since the international actor is 
much more powerful that any local actor participating in the translation process. 
Furthermore, the translation work is subject to the will of that specific group of states 
and is undermined whenever its development does not represent the interest of the 
Permanent Five. 
Nevertheless, when posing the question as to whether it is possible to 
integrate the principles of a post-abyssal model of peace and peacebuilding in the UN 
framework I am raising the possibility of reform of the UN’s system. Furthermore, the 
epistemologies of the South, although envisaging a holistic transformation of 
international politics, given that they argue for a change of paradigm by replacing the 
relationships of colonial and capitalist domination with bonds of solidarity, ask that 
we do not blindly reject what Western modernity has produced, and that we should 
wonder what actually can be integrated as part of the ecology of knowledges (Santos, 
2007: 69). Therefore, I am seeking the transformation that could perhaps occur in UN 
peacebuilding if the organisation was willing to develop a more sensitive approach to 
specific post-conflict contexts and to accept the existence of different peaces. That 
said, following the epistemologies of the South proposal it is important to strive to try 
to understand if it would be possible for the UN to change its approach to the local in 
order to learn from and with the South through a translation process. 
The UN has, for the last 15 years, been paying greater attention to the local, 
not only with respect to peace and security, but also, for example, in the fields of 
development and environmental sustainability (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). The 
local has been mainly related to the concept of ownership: the idea that local 
populations and governments have an important role to play in the establishment of 
peace. Local ownership has emerged mainly to enhance the legitimacy of UN 
interventions, calling on the institution to promote locally owned peace construction 
projects, and to be aware of the emergence of local capabilities (UNDPKO, 2008; 
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Richmond, 2012). Thus, the UN has widely integrated the logic of the local in its policy 
documents. A report states that  
Local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including 
marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices 
to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership 
around a common vision for the country’s future (UNSG, 2009: § 12). 
Similar discourses have been propagated by different UN agencies and offices 
concerned with peace construction and development, in particular the Peacebuilding 
Commission and the UN Development Program. 
Despite the general development of this rhetoric, “(…) it remains far from 
clear what it means, what external actors (…) can or should do in order to facilitate it, 
or how tensions that inevitably arise between the priorities of national owners and 
those of international donors (…) are to be reconciled” (UNPSO, 2011: 2). More 
important than the uncertainty of the definition of local ownership and the doubts 
about how to operationalise it is the fact that the local is being conceptualised within 
the liberal paradigm, since it is international actors who identify the relevant local 
actors with which to engage. For the UN, the local is important and valuable, not 
because it expresses and develops its own ideas about peace but, on the contrary, 
because it is an important instrument for the more efficient assimilation of the liberal 
project. The local the UN wishes to promote and empower is the “civil society of like-
minded activists who agree with human rights frameworks, development, and 
democratization, as projected by international norms” (Richmond, 2012: 355). 
The discussion about the local is being reinstated because the approach of 
the UN to the local is one of the biggest obstacles to the participation of this 
organisation in a process of translation aimed at learning different understandings of 
peace, and, therefore, changes in this area are compulsory for the UN to integrate 
post-abyssal peacebuilding. This change would entail dismissing the concept of local 
ownership. According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the idea of the local is 
developed through opposition to the scales of the universal and the global, the 
dominant scales. As a result, specific contexts are considered particular and incapable 
of being credible alternatives to the dominant scale (Santos, 2014: 173-174). This is 
the prevailing logic behind the local as defined by the UN and dismissing that concept 
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would therefore be an important step in the transformation of its peacebuilding 
model. The organisation would need to approach specific post-conflict contexts and 
accept their conceptualisations of peace. Those peaces might not be based on the state 
and the market, but on traditional forms of social and political organisation and 
popular forms of economy instead. 
The local would need to be recognised for its own value and not for its 
importance to developing the liberal project. Thus, the UN would need to be able to 
recognise that what is produced by the locals is valuable and it should not be wasted. 
That said, the liberal project would have to make room for endogenous forms of 
political, social, cultural and economic organisation. Take the example of Bali, 
Indonesia, where in the 1960s the traditional irrigation systems based on ancestral 
religious, agrarian, and hydrological knowledge was replaced with more scientific 
ones. The result for the rice crops was so disastrous that the new technological 
irrigation system had to be replaced by the old one, based on ancestral non-scientific 
knowledge (Santos, 2014: 205). This example is illustrative of the importance of local 
knowledge in local contexts, but also of the value of such knowledge to the 
broadening of knowledge in general. The UN, when approaching specific post-conflict 
contexts, cannot ignore the reality already existing in the field. Local forms of 
organisation have to be balanced with the liberal conception of progress, and the 
reforms adopted should be the ones that suit local needs and specificities rather than 
the ones that more easily advance the liberal project. 
In order to participate in a process of translation that aims to establish a 
dialogue between different conceptions of peace the UN has to abandon the idea that 
peace means the progress defined in Western terms, and to acknowledge that 
sometimes, maybe most times, the best solutions for peace lie in ancient knowledges 
and locally based forms of political, social and economic organisation. This different 
view of the local is another basic premise for a change in the current model of 
peacebuilding and the integration of the work of translation by the UN. Losing the 
conceptualisation of the local, as opposed to the global, would mean starting a 
learning process from the South and with the South, that would inevitably render the 
liberal peace project more flexible and predisposed to dialogue with other peaces. 
-95- 
 
This learning process implies endorsing non-liberal solutions, in both the global 
North and the global South, when it becomes clear that those solutions solve the 
problem in question in a satisfactorily manner, even if it means adopting solutions 
considered archaic or backward. 
In the context of peace construction, this process of learning would lead to 
the emergence of many different forms of peace, some being of an emancipatory 
nature, possibly rendering the liberal peace obsolete in the long term. Achieving the 
interaction of the governance model of the liberal peace, in political, social and 
economic terms, with endogenous peace perspectives is an emancipatory endeavour. 
The peaces resulting from this learning process are socially more just, since they 
address the grievances of local populations claiming more equitable and horizontal 
relations of power. The goal of a learning process from and with the South is to 
conceive emancipatory peaces that address populations’ most fundamental dreams. 
So, the integration of post-abyssal peacebuilding in the UN peace structure 
faces three main obstacles: first, the association of the organisation with modern 
Western thinking; second, the power relations that structure the UN and its 
hierarchical constitution; third, the conceptualisation of the local as a space of 
particularities. Going back to our hypothesis, can the UN be one of the actors involved 
in a translation process aimed at establishing a dialogue between different models of 
peace, the exploration of the obstacles faced in this process leads me to the 
conclusion that this hypothesis cannot be confirmed. The UN would need to go 
through profound changes before it could participate in a fair and equal process of 
translation. It would need to lose its modern character and abandon the pursuit of 
relationships of a colonial and capitalist character. Basically, a new international 
organisation, based on a more solidary and democratic structure, would be needed. 
Besides these obstacles, the risks for the epistemologies of the South project would be 
too great. A counter-hegemonic project would essentially face the danger of being 
coopted and transformed in order to suit hegemonic projects, thereby more 
efficiently fulfilling the role the concept of local ownership has played so far: using the 
local to more easily impose liberal peace. 
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The epistemologies of the South aim to start a dialogue between progressive 
actors in order to reveal the epistemological diversity of the world and achieve 
cognitive justice, the precondition for social justice. Therefore three sociological tools 
are used: the sociology of absences, the sociology of emergences and the work of 
translation. When thinking about peace, and with the post-abyssal peacebuilding 
model defined above in mind, I consider that the sociologies of absences and 
emergences, that is, the work of revealing the different epistemologies of peace in the 
world, should, for now, remain with academia. The idea of post-abyssal peacebuilding 
needs to be further studied, developed, structured and consolidated. Bringing the 
sociologies of absences and emergences to the study of international relations, 
particularly the study of peace, would allow a broader conceptualisation of the local 
and consequently a broader understanding of peace. 
The third sociological tool, the work of translation, should continue being 
developed by the social actors involved in the contestation of hegemonic forms of 
peace, acting both in the global South and in the global North. This way, translators 
should be “good subaltern cosmopolitan intellectuals” (Santos, 2014: 231). They can 
be found in NGOs, social movements and any social group or organisation working to 
construct specific solutions of peace for specific contexts. What is asked of them is 
that they should be able to constantly translate academic knowledge into non-
academic knowledge, and vice-versa. The goal is to construct an imperial South, with 
the interconnection of the extreme diversity of social experiences of the world. Here 
lies the importance of the work of translation. Through the association of the 
epistemologies of the South project with thinking about peace is possible to relate the 
different forms of peace existing in the world, in the search for a post-abyssal peace. 
This is a transformatory project with the capacity to gradually develop to 
help the emergence of an ever-increasing number of emancipatory projects that can 
work together to contest the current colonial and capitalist rule. Post-abyssal 
peacebuilding is not concerned with rapid changes; it is more preoccupied with the 
construction of emancipatory alternatives that bear fruit at the present time. Post-
abyssal peacebuilding does not look ahead to a distant radiant future, it envisages 
working with concrete possibilities here and now. The goal is to break with the 
-97- 
 
suffering provoked by the colonial and capitalist system of domination we live in, 
reaching for emancipatory forms of social ordering that allow every single one of us 
to live our most fundamental dreams. 
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CONCLUSION 
Liberal peace became hegemonic after the end of the Cold War. That period 
saw the perfect conditions in place for the emergence of a solid concept of peace that 
could be consensually integrated in the UN peace framework. This allowed the 
development of the peacebuilding concept, which was then applied to post-conflict 
environments. It entailed the construction of a liberal state, based on representative 
democracy and the rule of law, and a liberal economy, based on the free market. 
Nevertheless, liberal peacebuilding soon started to show problems of both 
application and conceptualisation. Contrary to the lasting peace promised by 
intervention in post-conflict countries, the result of these missions was often a return 
to conflict. Consequently, critiques on peacebuilding implementation and the liberal 
concept of peace started to appear. These critiques were on different levels, ranging 
from the more conservative that argued for reform, to the more critical that sought to 
dismiss the whole liberal peace concept. 
This dissertation can be included with the critical works on peacebuilding 
and the liberal peace. It has two basic premises: first, like other critical authors have 
said, the peace promised by the UN has never been fully accomplished and, in reality, 
applying the liberal peace to post-conflict countries has had perverse effects, 
representing simply another domination instrument used by the global North on the 
global South; second, the critical thought developed on liberal peacebuilding and the 
local reflects the consequences of local agency resistance to international 
intervention, but does not explore the conceptions of peace and associated 
knowledges that produce such resistance. Thus, is considered that critical 
conceptualisations of peace would benefit from a reflection on liberal peace and 
peacebuilding that fosters a better understanding the hegemonic relationship 
between the global North and the global South, which is rooted in a specific 
epistemology, namely, modern Western reason. In addition, the knowledge of the 
local would be furthered through the use of a conceptual framework that helps to 
identify the local epistemologies that support local understandings of peace, as 
opposed to the liberal paradigm. 
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I decided to explore the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos to help me 
address these two premises. He has dedicated part of his academic career to the study 
of knowledge and to the relation between the hegemonic epistemology, modern 
Western thinking, and subaltern and devalued epistemologies, manly associated with 
the global South. The research question that governed the development of this work 
therefore was: how Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ conceptual framework of the 
epistemologies of the South can further the knowledge and practice of peacebuilding? 
My goal was to draw attention to the diversity of epistemologies existing in 
the world and to the different formulations of peace they might influence. I am 
concerned with identifying and defining the local peaces that confront international 
liberal peace and produce hybrid understandings. Thus, the studies on the local that 
have until now been concerned exclusively with local agency at the moment of 
intervention, can be furthered by attributing the due importance to local 
epistemologies, and thus recognising local agency more widely. The relevance of 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ work to the study of liberal peace lies in his quest to 
reveal the oppressor character of modern Western epistemology on which the liberal 
peace is founded, and to expose the plurality of knowledges extant in the world. 
The author pursues his quest by defining modern Western thinking as an 
abyssal thinking, in the sense that it permanently erases the other epistemologies 
present in the world. This is a central concept to analysing how liberal peace interacts 
with other models of peace. Furthermore, he constructs a conceptual framework to 
demonstrate the epistemological diversity of the world, and I consider this to be 
extremely valuable for the field of peace studies, since it helps to develop broader 
understandings of peace, based on endogenous knowledges. Those concepts are the 
sociology of emergences, the sociology of absences and the work of translation. The 
first two serve to rescue from oblivion the variety of knowledges that oppose modern 
Western thinking and that have been qualified as inferior by it. The last one aims to 
establish a dialogue between different knowledges so as to arrive at common 
emancipatory practices. 
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I have, therefore, related this conceptual framework to the liberal peace and 
liberal peacebuilding concepts. The analysis of the model of liberal peace through the 
concept of abyssal lines allows a broader understanding of its epistemological and 
ontological nature, and thus constitutes a deeper critique of this model. Envisaging 
liberal peace as an abyssal line clearly shows the connection between this model of 
peace and modern Western thinking. Liberal peace is another manifestation of the 
colonialist and capitalist character of this thought, as it represents relationships of 
coercion and violence that impose social, political and economic models that are often 
strange to local epistemologies. Hence, the first hypothesis of this dissertation is 
validated, in that the use of the concept of abyssal global lines makes it possible to 
construct an epistemological critique of the liberal peace. 
The second hypothesis, using the concepts defined in the framework of the 
epistemologies of the South contributes to revealing alternative conceptions and 
practices of peace based on different epistemologies is also validated, through the 
definition of a peacebuilding model that serves to accommodate different 
epistemologies of peace and establishes a dialogue between them. The goal of post-
abyssal peacebuilding is to identify emancipatory types of peace, thus conferring 
epistemological justice on the variety of peaces in the world with the goal of achieving 
social justice for those affected by the exploitation of the capitalist and colonial 
system. Post-abyssal peacebuilding facilitates the dialogue between progressive 
actors concerned with emancipatory types of peace, in the quest for common 
understandings of peace and with the goal of strengthening the counter-hegemonic 
opposition to the liberal peace. 
Finally, I felt that this would be an unfinished work if I did not explore the 
possibility of the UN integrating the post-abyssal peacebuilding model. I found three 
obstacles to this exercise: first, the prevalence of modern Western reason in the 
functioning of the organisation; second, its highly hierarchical constitution and the 
deeply rooted power relations that structure it; third, the UN conceptualisation of the 
local as a space of particularities. Overcoming these obstacles would entail a 
significant transformation in the United Nations structure and form of action, changes 
that the most powerful states governing the organisation, the five permanent 
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members of the Security Council, would not be willing to make. Those changes would 
signify an enormous loss of power and an alteration in the domination relationships 
that have structured the world for the last five centuries and have put those states at 
the top of the international system. Therefore, the last hypothesis ruling this work 
was not validated. The work of translation, as mentioned before, should lie in the 
hands of progressive actors that will fight for the affirmation of alternative 
emancipatory concepts of peace, both in the global South and in the global North. 
So, recalling the research question that guided this dissertation, the 
knowledge about peacebuilding would be furthered with the integration of the 
conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South by peace studies. This 
conceptual framework helps to look at local agency in more depth, allowing 
understanding of its resistances to international intervention and externally 
formulated models of peace. It does so by bringing to light the local concepts of peace 
that have structured such resistances, thus revealing the knowledges, that is, the local 
epistemologies, which inspired those endogenously formulated visions of peace. This 
expands current understandings of peace and thus the knowledge produced by peace 
studies is enhanced through the disclosure of the epistemological variety of the 
world. Furthermore, the epistemological enrichment fostered by the epistemologies 
of the South confronts the hegemonic character of modern Western thinking and, 
consequently, the universal character of liberal peace, thereby fulfilling one of the 
goals of critical studies, which is to question the power relations that structure 
international reality. 
Using the conceptual framework of the epistemologies of the South is 
consistent with the search for a “general and complete peace”, the aim of peace 
studies as defined by Johan Galtung. According to him, peace should entail the non-
existence of violence and be equated with social justice, meaning an egalitarian 
distribution of power and resources based on relations of integration, cooperation 
and harmony, and encompassing the whole world (Galtung, 1964, 1969). Having a 
broader understanding of peace paves the way for a more constructive manner of 
addressing the problems of war and conflict that affect vast populations in the world 
and prevent them from living their most fundamental dreams. 
-103- 
 
Therefore, the epistemologies of the South also represent a mechanism to 
approach the practice of peacebuilding, in the sense that, the work of translation 
makes it possible to create a dialogue between the different perceptions of peace 
revealed. This dialogue should take place both between peaces arising from 
epistemologies different from modern western thought and between those peaces 
and the liberal peace. The consequence is the emergence of models of peace that are 
context sensitive and better fit specific post-conflict realities, thus obtaining more 
lasting solutions for the problems affecting those populations. The epistemologies of 
the South framework can promote the practice of peacebuilding because, in contrast 
with the present reality of hybrid peace, the dialogue proposed is developed in a 
context of equal relations of power and equally valid forms of knowledge. 
Peacebuilding can thus be a process of shared understandings with the goal of 
achieving emancipatory peaces, instead of the process of violence that liberal 
peacebuilding represents. 
The work developed in this dissertation should be developed further and 
indeed some research paths appear evident at the moment. First, to deepen the 
integration of Boaventura de Sousa Santos work into the field of peace studies. This 
dissertation is a first attempt to bring this author to this field of knowledge, but more 
research on this subject is necessary. Therefore, the concept of post-abyssal 
peacebuilding should be further studied and developed. Like any other concept of 
peacebuilding, it needs to be consolidated to ensure the development of a coherent 
model. For this, the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos should be explored by other 
peace studies scholars with a view to better define how the peace construction model 
associated with the epistemologies of the South can be operationalised in post-
conflict contexts. Additionally, the author’s contribution to peace studies should be 
complemented by the work of authors who, like him, study the hegemonic character 
of modern Western epistemology and share the struggle to restore epistemological 
justice to the world. 
Moreover, I consider that it would be very interesting to understand how 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Johan Galtung works complement each other, where 
they overlap and where they diverge. Both authors share a broader understanding of 
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reality than the Western perspective and, therefore, more expansive understandings 
of peace than the liberal one. Research in this direction would strengthen the 
dialogue between different disciplinary fields, and definitely enrich peace studies. 
Finally, new research on countries subjected to UN peacebuilding should be 
developed using the conceptual tools defined in the epistemologies of the South. Such 
works should ask the following question: what concepts of peace, framed by which 
epistemologies, engender hybrid understandings of peace in the context of UN 
interventions? The answer would reveal the peaces that different actors in post-
conflict countries would like to have developed if they had not been subjected to the 
liberal model. It would also allow cross-case analysis so that the common patterns of 
these peaces could be identified and thus facilitate the translation work between 
these actors. 
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